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Preface
Innovation policy in Britain has become tired and is in 
need of refreshing. This pamphlet by Mariana Mazzucato, 
currently Professor in the Economics of Innovation at the 
Open University, and soon to be the new RM Phillips Chair 
in Science and Technology Policy at the University of Sussex, 
is therefore a timely and important contribution to what is a 
necessary debate. Over the last two decades, if not longer, the 
British Government has defined its role in economic policy as 
working to ensure a macroeconomy and infrastructure that 
is conducive to private sector activity, only intervening where 
there is a supposed market failure; beyond that it leaves the 
job of wealth creation to the market. Up to a point, that works. 
But, as this pamphlet shows, opportunities are being missed if 
recent developments in innovation literature, economic theory 
in general, and experience from elsewhere in the world are not 
also drawn on in setting UK policy.
The first insight, described in chapter 3, is that networks 
and connections really matter. This is not a surprise to 
those involved in the growing discipline of complexity and 
behavioural economics, but it is a fact that does not yet lie at 
the heart of UK economic policy. We understand that there 
is value in a cluster, and we support the building of business 
incubation units in science parks, but we do not fully accept the 
responsibility of government continually to foster horizontal 
links between existing institutions in order to create a flat 
structured national system of innovation in every discipline.
The second insight is that even where the network exists, 
it takes a nimble, interventionist, knowledge-hungry state 
to catalyse them into action. If it is in the public interest for 
innovation to occur, there is a role for the public sector to 
require it to happen, rather than sitting back and hoping it 
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will happen of its own accord provided the conditions are 
right. Countries playing economic catch-up are able to do 
this relatively easily by having government strategies that 
copy what has happened elsewhere in the world. At the 
frontiers of knowledge, the role of government is harder to 
comprehend. This pamphlet draws on the experience of the 
USA in particular to show that innovation is far more likely to 
happen when it is commissioned via a multitude of contracts 
for particular advances or technological solutions, rather than 
by — for example — providing tax credits for general research 
and development, or badgering the banks to lend more to 
certain parts of the economy. This is not so much nudge as 
necessity. And scale matters.
The political danger is that in an era where 
governments — and to a degree the public — believe the state 
has got too big, any talk of an interventionist approach in 
growth policy will be intellectually filed under the same 
heading as the failed policies of the 1970s. But this is not 
about hand-outs to unproductive national champions, nor is it 
Keynesian demand management. It is about looking at what 
works and making it work for the UK.
The complexity economist W Brian Arthur in his 
recent book The Nature of Technology talks about technology 
in a functional way as a means to a purpose, and about 
innovation as the combination and Darwinian-style evolution 
of complementary technologies.1 Radical change occurs 
when a new underlying principle is invoked in order to solve 
the technological problem being considered when more 
conventional solutions have failed.
We hope that this pamphlet will, in its own way, 
provoke a radical change in the understanding of the role that 
government can play in economic policy. We hope to spark a 
conversation about what the state can do to use its power to 
specify the problems it wishes to solve through technological 
advance and innovation, thereby ensuring that those advances 
are able to take place.
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In summary, we say we want a more entrepreneurial 
economy. That doesn’t necessarily require the state to withdraw, 
but to lead.
Kitty Ussher
Director of Demos
June 2011
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Introduction and summary
Across the globe we are hearing that the state has to be cut 
back in order to foster a post-crisis recovery, unleashing the 
power of entrepreneurship and innovation in the private 
sector. This feeds a perceived contrast that is repeatedly 
drawn by the media, business and libertarian politicians 
of a dynamic, innovative, competitive private sector versus 
a sluggish, bureaucratic, inertial, ‘meddling’ public sector. 
So much so that it is virtually accepted by the public as a 
‘common sense’ truth.
For example, in his budget speech of June 2010, a month 
after taking office, the Chancellor, George Osborne, stated 
that the public sector was ‘crowding out’ the private sector, 
providing an additional justification beyond the need to 
reduce the deficit, for a relative contraction of the state. Both 
in the documentation that supported that emergency budget, 
and subsequently, the Coalition Government has repeatedly 
called for a more ‘balanced’ economy, with private activity 
taking up a greater share of the total than has previously been 
the case. The Prime Minister, David Cameron, adopted a more 
polemic tone in a speech given to the Cardiff Spring Forum 
in March 2011 when he promised to take on the ‘enemies of 
enterprise’ working in government, which he defined as the 
‘bureaucrats in government departments’.2 This is a rhetoric 
that fits with the Government’s broader theme of the Big 
Society, where responsibility for the delivery of public services 
is shifted away from the state to individuals operating either 
on their own or by coming together through the third sector.
And it is not a view that is unique to the UK Government. 
The Economist, which often refers to government as a Hobbesian 
Leviathan,3 recently argued that government should take the 
back seat and focus on creating freer markets and creating  
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the right conditions for new ideas to prosper, rather than 
taking a more activist approach.4 The established business 
lobby groups have long argued for freedom from the long 
arm of the state, which they see as stifling their ability to 
succeed through the imposition of employee rights, tax and 
regulation. The right-wing Adam Smith Institute argues 
that the number of regulators in the UK should be reduced 
to enable the British economy to ‘experience a burst of 
innovation and growth’.5 In the USA, supporters of the Tea 
Party movement are united by a desire to limit state budgets 
and promote free markets.
While business as a whole may not see the virtues of 
anything that does not have a clear and positive impact on its 
bottom line, and nor arguably should it, there is a danger when 
a general desire to reduce the size of the state translates into 
weak and non-ambitious economic policy. When that happens, 
we are all losers: policy is not as effective as it could be and the 
potential to create greater prosperity is not fulfilled.
This pamphlet argues that there is a real danger of that 
happening in the field of innovation policy, greatly limiting 
its impact on economic growth. The view of the current 
government — shared by its predecessor — is that the role of the 
state in spurring innovation is simply to provide the ‘conditions 
for innovation to flourish’.6 The UK Government states that if it 
invests in skills and a strong science base, ensures a strong legal 
framework within an amenable macroeconomy, and supports 
entrepreneurial clusters, then the market will do the rest 
through the incentive of the profit motive.
The evidence presented in this pamphlet challenges 
this minimalist view of the state in the field of economic 
policy, arguing that a far more proactive role is required. 
The case that is made in these pages is that the role of the 
government, in the most successful economies, has gone 
way beyond creating the right infrastructure and setting the 
rules. It is a leading agent in achieving the type of innovative 
breakthroughs that allow companies, and economies, to grow, 
not just by creating the ‘conditions’ that enable innovation. 
Rather the state can proactively create strategy around a new 
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high growth area before the potential is understood by the 
business community (from the internet to nanotechnology), 
funding the most uncertain phase of the research that the 
private sector is too risk-averse to engage with, seeking 
and commissioning further developments, and often even 
overseeing the commercialisation process.. In this sense it has 
played an important entrepreneurial role.
Of course there are plenty of examples of private 
sector entrepreneurial activity, from the role of young new 
companies in providing the dynamism behind new sectors 
(eg Google), to the important source of funding from private 
sources like venture capital. But this is the only story that is 
usually told. Silicon Valley and the emergence of the biotech 
industry are usually attributed to the geniuses behind the 
small high tech firms like Facebook or the plethora of small 
biotech companies in Boston or Cambridge in the UK. 
Europe’s ‘lag’ behind the USA is often attributed to its weak 
venture capital sector. Examples from these high tech sectors 
in the USA are often used to argue why we need less state and 
more market: to allow Europe to produce its own Googles. 
But how many people know that the algorithm that led to 
Google’s success was funded by a public sector National 
Science Foundation grant? 7 Or that molecular antibodies, 
which provided the foundation for biotechnology before 
venture capital moved into the sector, were discovered in 
public Medical Research Council (MRC) labs in the UK? 
Or that many of the most innovative young companies in the 
USA were funded not by private venture capital but by public 
venture capital such as through the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) programme?
Lessons from these experiences are important. They force 
the debate to go beyond the role of the state in stimulating 
demand, or the role of the state in ‘picking winners’ in 
industrial policy, where taxpayers’ money is potentially 
misdirected to badly managed firms in the name of progress, 
distorting incentives as it goes along. Instead it is a case for 
a targeted, proactive, entrepreneurial state, able to take risks, 
creating a highly networked system of actors harnessing the 
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best of the private sector for the national good over a medium- 
to long-term horizon. It is the state as catalyst, and lead 
investor, sparking the initial reaction in a network that will 
then cause knowledge to spread. The state as creator of the 
knowledge economy.
It cannot be called ‘new’ industrial policy because it is in 
fact what has happened, though in a ‘hidden way’ to prevent a 
backlash, over the last three decades in the development of the 
computer industry, the internet, the pharma–biotech industry, 
and many more including today’s nanotech industry.8 None 
of these technological revolutions would have occurred 
without the leading role of the state. It is about admitting that 
in many cases, it has in fact been the state, not the private 
sector, that has had the vision for strategic change, daring to 
think — against all odds — about the ‘impossible’, creating a 
new technological opportunity, making the large necessary 
investments, and enabling a decentralised network of actors to 
enable the risky research, and to allow the development and 
commercialisation process to occur in a dynamic way.
This pamphlet draws together recent academic literature 
to make new policy conclusions. In doing so it presents a very 
timely contribution to the debate around deficit reduction 
in the UK and elsewhere. And in passing, it confronts head-
on some issues that have come to be taken for granted by 
mainstream policy makers, such as the usefulness of data 
on patenting and R&D expenditure as proxies for wealth-
creating innovation. The part played by the small firm in 
creating growth is also put under scrutiny as is the role of 
venture capital.
This is not a pamphlet about innovation policy. Many 
themes on that general topic are missing here: the skills 
gap, diffusion of existing innovations, procurement and 
deployment. It is about the entrepreneurial role that the 
state has played in different innovation contexts, leading 
rather than following. Thinking out of the box, defining new 
radical technologies and the associated eras (the knowledge 
economy), rather than just reacting to them. Understanding 
this lesson forces us to rethink what the state brings to 
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the ecology of the business-government partnerships so 
discussed today.
The main task is to unpack the role of the state in 
fostering radical growth-enhancing innovations, and so to 
make recommendations that would not only improve the 
effectiveness of economic policy but also ensure that the 
limited taxpayers’ money that is available is more effectively 
spent. The fear is that without understanding the proactive 
role required of government for an effective economic policy, 
the UK economy will fail to achieve its potential at precisely 
the time when economic dynamism is most necessary.
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 1 sets the 
scene by summarising the academic framework regarding 
the debate around growth; whereas a generation ago, 
technological advance was seen as something that was 
externally given, there is now extensive literature to show 
that actually it is the rate, and direction, of innovation that 
drives the ability for economies to grow. This provides the 
justification for increased focus on the role that government 
can play to facilitate precisely that innovation, while at the 
same time exploding some of the myths that abound in 
Westminster, the European Commission and Washington 
about what actually drives innovation and growth. 
Specifically, it draws on recent academic literature to show 
that targeting resources towards R&D spend, patenting or 
small firms in isolation misses the point and that similarly 
waiting for venture capital to do all the heavy lifting is likely 
to be futile.
Chapter 2 describes the importance of the government’s 
role in investing where the private sector will not, in the most 
uncertain risky areas. But rather than understanding this 
through the usual lens of ‘market failures’, the concept of 
entrepreneurial risk-taking is introduced. The public sector 
has indeed fulfilled an important role in undertaking the most 
risky research, even when that research was not ‘basic’. Private 
sector examples are provided from the pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries where it has been the state, not the private 
sector, that has created economic dynamism. Risky research 
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is funded by the publicly funded labs (the National Institutes 
of Health or the MRC) while private pharma focuses on less 
innovative ‘me too drugs’ and private venture capitalists enter 
only once the real risk has been absorbed by the state. And yet 
make all the money. In industries with such long time horizons 
and complex technologies, it is argued that return-hungry 
venture capital can in fact sometimes be more damaging than 
helpful to the ability of the sector to produce valuable new 
products.
Chapter 3 argues that it is only by creating a so-called 
national system of innovation built on sharing knowledge 
that the necessary, if not sufficient, conditions start to 
be established. An example is drawn by comparing and 
contrasting the two examples of Japan and the Soviet Union. 
It then develops the concept of the entrepreneurial state 
where not only is there a fully functioning national system of 
innovation, but this system is catalysed by proactive, flexible, 
decentralised action on the part of government.
Chapter 4 examines aspects of the recent industrial 
policy history of the USA, and shows that despite common 
perceptions, the US state has been extremely proactive and 
entrepreneurial in the development and commercialisation 
of new technologies. Four examples — the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR), orphan drugs and recent developments in 
nanotechnology — are used to illustrate this point.
Chapter 5 provides some reflections that are relevant 
to the situation faced by the UK at the moment, with policy 
recommendations for the development of green technology, 
and technology, generally. Green technology has the potential 
to become the next technological revolution, but as no other 
technological revolution has simply been ‘nudged’ by the state, 
it is unrealistic that this one can be without the type of large 
scale (though decentralised) investments that have been made 
in the case of other important new technologies.
And finally, chapter 6 concludes with some reflections on 
the implications of the concept of the entrepreneurial state for 
the debate around fairness and distribution.
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Taken together, the pamphlet paints a fuller 
understanding of the public sector’s centrality to risk-taking 
and radical growth fostering technological change. It builds 
a very different picture of the state from that envisaged by 
present economic policy, which denies it any leading role 
in innovation and production, and that of conventional 
industrial policy, which unduly downplays its scope for 
pioneering and promoting new technologies. In contrast, it 
describes scenarios where the state has provided the main 
source of dynamism and innovation in advanced industrial 
economies, pointing out that the public sector has been the 
lead player in what is often referred to as the ‘knowledge 
economy’ — an economy driven by technological change 
and knowledge production and diffusion. Indeed, from the 
development of aviation, nuclear energy, computers, the 
internet, the biotechnology revolution, nanotechnology and 
even now in green technology, it is, and has been, the state 
not the private sector that has kick-started and developed the 
engine of growth, because of its willingness to take risk in 
areas where the private sector has been too risk-averse. In a 
policy environment where the frontiers of the state are now 
being deliberately rolled back, that process needs more than 
ever to be understood so that it can successfully be replicated. 
Otherwise we miss an opportunity to build greater prosperity 
in the future.
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Recommendations
This is a summary of the main recommendations:
• Reduce government spending on direct transfers to small 
firms, such as small business rates relief and inheritance tax 
relief. This is a cost saving.
• If the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) is enhanced, 
as the government has indicated, it must be done in a way 
that focuses on how to get SMEs to spend money on new 
technologies. To do so, it will need to increase the size of the 
project financing that it administers (too diluted currently), 
and concentrate on firms that prove they will spend on 
innovation. This is cost neutral.
• Abandon initiatives to establish a UK patent box (a preferential 
tax regime for profits arising from patents), which would not 
increase innovation and according to the Institute for Fiscal 
Studies would in time lead to greater taxpayer costs. This is a 
cost saving.
• Review R&D tax credits with a view to ensuring that firms 
are held accountable for actually spending the money 
on innovation, and failing that, shift away from blanket 
R&D tax credits to free up resources towards direct 
commissioning of the technological advance in question. 
This is a potential cost saving.
• Enterprise zones, that give regulatory or taxation advantages 
to firms in a certain area, are a distraction as they do not cause 
innovation to happen that would not have taken place elsewhere. 
Best to use the money in other ways. This is a cost saving.
• When successful, a part of the return from investments 
made with significant public support should be returned to 
government. This is a potential cost saving.
Recommendations
• Use these freed-up resources to engage in a massive expansion 
of the Technology Strategy Board, structured in line with 
the model of the US DARPA to directly enable innovation 
(research, development and commercialisation) through 
a bottom-up government-directed network of agencies, in 
line with recommendations of the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) in 2006.9 It also requires more transparency 
about funding decisions and clearer auditing of performance 
so that failing performance areas are cut off. This would 
increase expenditure.
• Adopt a more proactive interventionist approach to green 
technology innovation, drawing on the UK’s specific 
strengths. This would increase expenditure.
• The time any private equity investment must be held before the 
gains from sale can be exempt from capital gains tax, should 
be raised in the UK to at least five years (currently only two, 
previously ten in 2002). This would help prevent the ‘take 
the money and run’ in green tech, which has characterised 
investments in biotechnology companies, most of which 
remain ‘product-less’. This is a cost saving.
• Short-termism is especially problematic in contexts in which 
radical technological change is needed and the reason why 
venture capital and other forms of private equity are not 
playing a leading role in green technology. Given the lack of 
private investments, the UK government should step up and 
increase its ‘green’ budget. The Green Investment Bank is 
not enough. This would increase expenditure.
27

29
1  From invisible hand  
to modern myths
 
The view of the current UK Government regarding its role in 
stimulating innovation is to create an environment where the 
private sector can flourish. A growth review by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and HM Treasury 
said it is to ‘provide the conditions for private sector growth 
and investment’.10
The core of the BIS and Treasury plan outlines the way 
that government must be limited, reducing red tape and 
bureaucracy so the private sector can get on with what it does 
best: investing, innovating, employing:
A new approach to growth requires a new attitude in Government. 
Government on its own cannot create growth. It is the decisions 
of business leaders, entrepreneurs and individual workers 
which build our economy. What the Government can do is 
provide the conditions for success to promote a new economic 
dynamism — harnessing our economic strengths, removing the 
barriers which prevent markets from supporting enterprise, and 
putting the private sector first when making decisions on tax, 
regulation and spending.11
In a special report on the world economy  
The Economist stated:
A smart innovation agenda, in short, would be quite different from 
the one that most rich governments seem to favour. It would be 
more about freeing markets and less about picking winners; more 
about creating the right conditions for bright ideas to emerge and 
less about promises like green jobs. But pursuing that kind of policy 
requires courage and vision — and most of the rich economies are 
not displaying enough of either.12
From invisible hand to modern myths
This view is also espoused by some ‘progressive’ 
academics, who argue that the state is limited to:
Creation of the conditions for innovation… accepting that the state 
will have a vital role in ensuring that market conditions reach the 
‘just right’ balance which will spur innovation and that adequate 
investment is available for innovators.13
This is the view that justifies little more of government 
than correcting market failures — through investment in basic 
science, education and infrastructure, for example. This is 
not a new debate, but it is one that benefits from a greater 
understanding of the academic literature on the role of 
innovation in creating economic growth.
More than 250 years ago, when discussing his notion 
of the ‘Invisible Hand’ Adam Smith argued that capitalist 
markets left on their own would self-regulate, with the state’s 
role being limited to that of creating basic infrastructure 
(schools, hospitals, motorways) and making sure that private 
property, and other institutions such as ‘trust’, were nurtured 
and protected.14 His background in politics and philosophy 
meant that his writings were much more profound than the 
simple libertarian economics position for which he is usually 
acknowledged, but there is no escaping that he believed that 
the magic of capitalism consisted in the ability of the market to 
organise production and distribution without coercion by the 
state. Karl Polanyi, the acclaimed sociologist of capitalism, has 
instead shown how the notion of the market as self-regulating 
is a myth from the historical beginning of markets: ‘The road 
to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous 
increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism.’ 15 In this view, it was the state which imposed 
the emergence of the market.
John Maynard Keynes believed that capitalist markets, 
regardless of their origin, need constant regulation because 
of the inherent instability of capitalism where private business 
investment (one of the four categories of spending in GDP) is 
extremely volatile. The reason it is so volatile is that far from 
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being a simple function of interest rates or taxes,16 it is subject 
to ‘animal spirits’ — the gut instinct of investors about future 
growth prospects in an economy or specific sector.17 In his view 
this uncertainty creates constant periods of underinvestment, 
or overinvestment, causing severe economic fluctuations due to 
the multiplier effect (whereby an increase or fall in spending is 
propagated throughout the economy by subsequent rounds of 
the fall or increase). Unless regulated by increased government 
spending, falls in spending can lead to the emergence of 
depressions, a fact of life before Keynes’ ideas found their way 
into post-Second World War economic policies.
More recently, Hyman Minsky focused on the financial 
fragility of capitalism, the way that financial markets cause 
periodic crises to occur due to cycles of expansion, exaggerated 
expectations and credit formation, followed by retraction, 
causing bubbles to burst and asset prices to collapse. He too 
believed that the state had a crucial role in preventing this 
vicious cycle from happening, and for growth to follow a more 
stable path.18
Keynes and Minsky focused on the need for the state to 
intervene in order to bring stability and prevent crises, certainly 
a pressing issue in today’s circumstances. The pamphlet 
focuses on the role of the state in allowing private and public 
organisations to interact in such a way that new knowledge 
is produced and diffused throughout the economy to allow 
structural change and growth. But to understand the dynamics 
of such investments it is fundamental first to better understand 
different perspectives on the theory of economic growth, and 
the role of technology and innovation in this process.
Where does growth come from?
While growth and the wealth of nations has been the lead 
concern of economists since Adam Smith, in the 1950s it 
was shown by Moses Abramovitz and Robert Solow that 
conventional measures of capital and labour inputs could 
not account for 90 per cent of economic growth in an 
advanced industrialised country such as the United States.19 
From invisible hand to modern myths
It was assumed that the unexplained residual must reflect 
productivity growth, rather than the quantity of factors of 
production. And still today there is immense debate among 
economists over which factors are most important in producing 
growth. This debate is reflected in politics where different 
views about growth are espoused with great vehemence, 
often ignorant of the underlying theoretical assumptions and 
origins, so well put by Keynes:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when 
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than 
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from 
any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, 
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few 
years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.20
For years, economists have tried to model growth. 
Neoclassical economics developed its first growth model in 
the work of Harrod and Domar, but it was Robert Solow who 
won the Nobel Prize for his growth ‘theory’. In the Solow 
growth model, growth is modelled through a production 
function where output (Y) is a function of the quantity 
of physical capital (K) and human labour (L), ceteris 
paribus — other things remaining equal. What other things? 
Technological change.
Y = F (K, L)
Changes in these two inputs cause changes along 
the function whereas upward or downward shifts in the 
function would be caused by technological change. When 
Solow discovered that 90 per cent of variation in output was 
not explained by capital and labour, he called the residual 
‘technical change’.21
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What perhaps should have happened at this point is 
that if the underlying model is found to be so deficient that it 
cannot explain 90 per cent of the dependent variable that it is 
meant to explain, a new model should have been developed. 
This was indeed what many, such as Joan Robinson, had been 
arguing for decades, highly critical of the production function 
framework.22 Instead technical change was added in. Solow’s 
theory became known as ‘exogenous growth theory’ because 
the variable for technology was inserted exogenously, as a time 
trend A (t) (similar to population growth):
Y = A (t) F (K, L)
As economists became more and more aware of the 
crucial role that technology plays in economic growth, it 
became necessary to think more seriously about how to include 
technology in growth models. This gave rise to ‘endogenous’ 
or ‘new growth’ theory, which modelled technology as the 
endogenous outcome of an R&D investment function, and 
as investment in human capital formation.23 Rather than 
assuming constant or diminishing marginal returns as in the 
Solow model (every extra unit of capital employed earned a 
smaller return), the addition of human capital and technology 
introduced increasing returns to scale, the engine of growth. 
Increasing returns, which arise from different types of dynamic 
behaviour like learning by doing, can help explain why certain 
firms or countries persistently outperform others — there is no 
‘catch-up’ effect.
Although new growth theory provided a rational 
argument for government investment it did not lead to it 
explicitly. This is because in this framework it was ideas that 
were endogenous not the institutional framework required to 
transform ideas into products. Nevertheless, the increasing 
emphasis on the relationship between technical change and 
growth indirectly led government policies to focus on the 
importance of investments in technology and human capital 
to foster growth, leading to innovation-led growth policies in 
the knowledge economy, a term used to denote the greater 
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importance in the competition process of investing in 
knowledge creation.24 Studies that showed a direct relationship 
between the market value of firms and their innovation 
performance measured by R&D spending and patents 
supported these policies.25
At the same time, there was an emerging field called 
Evolutionary Economics. In their ground-breaking 
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Nelson and 
Winter argued that in fact the production function 
framework (exogenous or endogenous) was the wrong one 
to use to understand technological change. It argued for an 
‘evolutionary theory’ of production (and economic change), 
which delved inside the ‘black box’ of the production function 
to understand how innovation takes place and its effect on 
growth.26 In this approach, there is no ‘representative agent’ 
but rather a constant process of differentiation among firms, 
based on their different abilities to innovate because of different 
internal routines and competencies. Competition in this 
perspective is about the co-evolution of those processes that 
create constant differences between firms and the processes 
of competitive selection that winnow in on those differences, 
allowing only some firms to survive and grow. In this context, 
since innovation is firm-specific, and highly uncertain, the 
types of policies that emerge for supporting innovation are 
different from those that emerge from a theoretical apparatus 
that assumes away the heterogeneity and uncertainty, as will 
be discussed in chapter 3, when we consider national systems 
of innovation.
R&D targets
The fact that economics was putting so much emphasis on 
innovation in the growth process caused policy makers, since 
the 1980s, to begin paying much more attention to variables 
like research and development (R&D) and patents, as a 
predicator of innovation and therefore of economic growth.27 
For example, the European Union’s Lisbon Agenda (2000) and 
its current Europe 2020 strategy 28 set a target for 3 per cent of 
35
the EU’s GDP to be invested in R&D, along with policies 
that try to encourage the flow of knowledge between 
universities and business, the creation of credit and venture 
capital for SMEs, and other factors identified as important 
for innovation-led growth.29 UK policy has also put a lot 
of emphasis on R&D,30 but as can be seen in figure 1, from 
1990 to 2003 the UK ranked below average compared with 
other major European competitors in its business R&D 
(BERD) spending.
This is not necessarily a problem as the sectors that the 
UK specialises in — financial services, construction and creative 
industries (such as music) — are not sectors in which innovation 
occurs necessarily through R&D.32 There are many industries, 
especially in the service sector, that do no R&D. Yet these 
industries often employ large numbers of knowledge workers 
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to generate, absorb and analyse information. If, all other things 
equal, these industries represented a smaller proportion of 
GDP, it would be easier for an economy to reach the 3 per cent 
target. But would the performance of the economy be superior 
as a result? It depends on how these industries contribute 
to the economy. Are these ‘low-tech’ industries providing 
important services that enhance the value-creating capabilities 
of other industries or the welfare of households as consumers? 
Or are they, as is often the case in financial services, focused 
on extracting value form the economy, even if that process 
undermines the conditions for innovation in other industries? 33
One of the problems that such simple targets encounter 
is that they divert attention from the vast differences in R&D 
spending across industries and even across firms within an 
industry. They can also mask significant differences in the 
complementary levels of R&D investments by governments 
and businesses that are required to generate superior 
economic performance. An even greater problem with 
R&D-based innovation policies is the lack of understanding 
of the complementary assets that must be in place to allow 
technological innovations to reach the market, eg infrastructure 
or capabilities around marketing.
Myth-busting 1: R&D is not enough
The literature on the economics of innovation, from 
different camps, has often assumed a direct causal link 
between R&D and innovation, and between innovation 
and economic growth. Yet, surprisingly, there are very 
few studies which prove that innovation carried out 
by large or small firms actually increases their growth 
performance — the macro models on innovation and growth 
do not seem to have strong empirical ‘micro foundations’.34 
Some company level studies have found a positive impact 
of innovation on growth35 while others no significant 
impact.36 And some studies have found even a negative 
impact of R&D on growth, which is not surprising:  
if the firms in the sample don’t have the complementary 
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characteristics needed, R&D becomes only a cost.37
It is thus fundamental to identify the company specific 
conditions that must be present to allow spending on innovation 
to affect growth. These conditions will no doubt differ between 
sectors. Demirel and Mazzucato, for example, find that in the 
pharmaceutical industry, only those firms that patent five years 
in a row (the ‘persistent’ patenters) and which engage in alliances 
achieve any growth from their R&D spending.38 Innovation 
policies in this sector must thus target not only R&D but also 
attributes of firms. Coad and Rao found that only the fastest 
growing firms reap benefits from their R&D spending  
(the top 6 per cent identified in Nesta’s report ‘The vital  
6 per cent’).39 And Mazzucato and Parris find that this 
result, of the importance of high growth firms, only holds in 
specific periods of the industry life-cycle when competition is 
particularly fierce.40
Myth-busting 2: Small is not necessarily beautiful
This finding that the impact of innovation on growth is indeed 
different for different types of firms has important implications 
for the commonly held assumption that ‘small firms’ matter 
(for growth, for innovation), and hence for the many different 
policies that target SMEs. The hype around small firms arises 
mainly from the confusion between size and growth. The most 
robust evidence is not on the role of small firms in the economy 
but the role of young high growth firms. Nesta, for example, 
claims that the most important firms for UK growth have been 
the small number of fast growing businesses that between 
2002 and 2008 generated the highest amount of employment 
growth in the UK.41 And while many high growth firms are 
small, many small firms are not high growth. The bursts of 
fast growth that promote innovation and create employment 
are often staged by firms that have existed for several years 
and grown incrementally until they reach a take-off stage. 
This is a major problem since so many government policies 
aim to target tax breaks and benefits to SMEs, with the aim of 
making the economy more innovative and productive.
From invisible hand to modern myths
Although there is much talk about small firms creating 
jobs,42 this is just a myth because while by definition small 
firms will cause jobs to increase, in fact many small firms also 
destroy a large number of jobs when they go out of business. 
Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda find that there is indeed no 
systematic relationship between firm size and growth.43 Most 
of the effect is from age: young firms (and business start-ups) 
contribute substantially to both gross and net job creation.
Productivity should be the focus, and small firms are 
indeed often less productive than large firms. Recent evidence 
has suggested that some economies that have favoured small 
firms, such as India, have in fact been punished. Hsieh and 
Klenow, for example, suggest that 40–60 per cent of the total 
factor productivity (TFP) difference between India and the 
USA is due to misallocation of output to too many small and 
low productivity SMEs in India.44 As most small start-up firms 
fail, or are incapable of growing beyond the sole owner-operator, 
targeting assistance to them through grants, soft loans or tax 
breaks will necessarily involve a high degree of waste.
Bloom and Van Reenan argue that small firms are less 
productive than large ones because they are less well managed, 
and subject to provincial family favouritism.45 Furthermore, 
small firms have lower average wages, fewer skilled workers, 
less training, fewer fringe benefits and are more likely to go 
bankrupt. They argue that the UK has many family firms and a 
poor record of management in comparison with other countries 
such as the USA and Germany.46 Among other reasons, this 
is related to the fact that the tax system is distorted to give 
inheritance tax breaks to family firms.
Some have interpreted the result that it is high growth 
rather than size that matters to mean that the best that 
governments can do is to provide the conditions for growth 
innovation. Bloom and Van Reenan argue that instead of 
having tax breaks and benefits target SMEs, the best way 
to support small firms is to ‘ensure a level playing field by 
removing entry barriers to firms of all sizes, reducing barriers 
to growth, enforcing competition policy and strongly resisting 
the lobbying efforts of larger firms and their agents’.47 But as 
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we will see in chapters 3 and 5, often the most innovative firms 
are precisely those that have benefitted the most from direct 
public investments of different types, making the case much 
more complex.
Myth-busting 3: Venture capital is not so risk-loving
If the role of small firms and R&D is overstated by policy 
makers, a similar hype exists in relation to the potential for 
venture capital to create growth, particularly in knowledge-
based sectors where capital intensity and technological 
complexity are high.
Venture capital is a type of private equity capital focused 
on early-stage, high-potential, growth companies. The funding 
tends to come either as seed funding or as later growth funding 
where the objective is to earn a high return after the IPO of the 
company or sale. Venture capital fills a void of funding for new 
firms, which often have trouble gaining credit from traditional 
financial institutions such as banks and thus often have to rely 
on other sorts of funding such as ‘business angels’ (including 
family and friends), venture capital and private equity. Such 
alternative funding is most important for new knowledge-based 
firms trying to enter existing sectors or new firms trying to 
form a new sector.
Risk capital is so scarce in the seed stage because there 
is a much higher degree of risk in this early phase, when the 
technological and demand conditions are completely uncertain. 
The falling risk in the different phases falls dramatically with 
the seed financing occurring when there is the most uncertainty 
about the potential of the new idea (table 1).
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Table 1   Risk of loss for different stages at which investments are made (%)
Figure 2 shows the usual place that it is assumed that 
venture capital will enter the stage of the invention-innovation 
process. In reality the real picture is much more non-linear 
and full of feedback loops. And many firms die during the 
transition between a new scientific or engineering discovery 
and its successful commercial transformation and application. 
Thus the third phase shown in figure 2 of commercial viability 
is often referred to as the valley of death.
Source: Ghosh and Nanda 49
Point at which investment made Risk of loss
Seed stage 66.2%
Start-up stage 53.0%
Second stage 33.7%
Third stage 20.1%
Bridge or pre-public stage 20.9%
Source: Pierrakis 48
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Figure 2 does not illustrate how time after time it has 
been public rather than privately funded venture capital 
that has taken the most risks. In the USA, government 
programmes such as the Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) programme and the Advanced Technology Program 
(ATP) in the US Dept of Commerce have provided 20–25 per 
cent of total funding for early stage technology firms. Thus 
government has played a leading role not only in the early 
stage research illustrated in figure 2, but also in the commercial 
viability stage. Auerswald and Branscomb claim that 
government funding for early stage technology firms is equal to 
the total investments of ‘business angels’ and about two to eight 
times the amount invested by private venture capital.50
Venture capital funds tend to be concentrated in areas 
of high potential growth, low technological complexity 
and low capital investment since the latter raises the cost 
significantly. Since there are so many failures in the high 
risk area, venture capital funds tend to have a portfolio 
of different investments with only the tails earning high 
returns — a very skewed distribution.
Although most venture capital funds are usually 
structured to have a life of ten years, because of the 
management fees and the bonuses earned for high returns, 
venture capital funds tend to prefer to exit much earlier than 
ten years, in order to establish a track record and raise a follow-
on fund. This creates a situation whereby venture capital funds 
therefore have a bias towards investing in projects where the 
commercial viability is established within a three to five year 
period.51 Although this is sometimes possible (eg Google) 
it is often not. And surely, in the case of an emerging sector 
like biotech or green tech today, where the underlying 
knowledge base is still in its early exploratory phase, such 
a short term bias is damaging to the scientific exploration 
process, which requires longer time horizons and more 
willingness to risk failure.
The role of US venture capital that worked was to provide 
not only committed finance, but also managerial expertise and 
ensure the building of a viable organisation.52
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The problem has been not only the lack of venture 
capital investment in the most needed early seed stage, but 
also its objectives in the process. This has been strongly 
evidenced in the biotech industry where an increasing number 
of researchers have criticised the model of venture capital in 
science, indicating that significant investor speculation has 
a detrimental effect on the underlying innovation.53 The fact 
that so many venture-capital-backed biotech companies end 
up producing nothing, yet make millions for the venture 
capital firms that sell them on the public market, is highly 
problematic for the role of venture capital in the development 
of science and its effect on the growth process. The increased 
presence of patenting and venture capital is not the right 
one for allowing risky and long term innovations to come 
about. Pisano in fact claimed that the stock market was never 
designed to deal with the governance challenges of R&D 
entities.54 Mirowski describes the venture-capital–biotech 
model as:
commercialized scientific research in the absence of any product 
lines, heavily dependent upon early-stage venture capital and a 
later IPO launch, deriving from or displacing academic research, 
with mergers and acquisitions as the most common terminal state, 
pitched to facilitate the outsourcing of R&D from large corporations 
bent upon shedding their previous in-house capacity.55
The problem with the model has been that the 
‘progressive commercialisation of science’ seems to be 
unproductive, with few products, and damage to long-run 
scientific discoveries and findings over time.
Myth-busting 4: A patent doesn’t necessarily 
mean progress
A similar misunderstanding exists in relation to the role of 
patents in innovation and economic growth. For example, 
when policy makers look at the number of patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry, they presume it is one of the most 
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innovative private sectors in the world. This rise in patents 
does not however reflect a rise in innovation, but a change in 
patent laws and a rise in the strategic reasons why patents are 
being used. This has caused their importance to be greatly 
hyped up — mythologised.
The exponential rise in patents, and the increasing lack 
of relationship this rise has had with actual ‘innovation’ 
(eg new products and processes), has occurred for various 
reasons. First, the types of inventions that can be patented 
has widened to include publicly funded research, upstream 
research tools (rather than only final products and processes) 
and even ‘discoveries’ (rather than only inventions) of 
existing matter such as genes. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, 
which allowed publicly funded research to be patented 
rather than remain in the public domain, encouraged the 
emergence of the biotechnology industry as most of the 
new biotech companies were new spin-offs from university 
labs with heavy state funding. Furthermore, the fact that 
venture capital often uses patents to signal which companies 
to invest in means that patents have increased in their 
strategic value to companies that need to attract financing. 
All these factors have caused the number of patents to rise, 
with most of them being of little worth (eg very few citations 
received from other patents) and without resulting in a high 
number of innovations, eg new drugs in pharma (figure 5). 
Thus directing too much attention to patents, rather than 
to specific types of patents, such as those that have high 
citations, risks wasting much money (as argued below for the 
patent box case).
Researchers have argued that many of the recent trends 
in patents, such as the increase in upstream patents (eg 
patenting of ‘research tools’), has caused the rate of innovation 
to fall rather than increase as it blocks the ability of science 
to move forwards in an open exploratory way.56 The effect 
has been especially deleterious to the ability of scientists in 
the developing world to repeat experiments carried out in the 
developed world, before undertaking their own developments 
on those experiments, thus hurting their ability to ‘catch up’.57
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Notwithstanding the fact that most patents are of 
little value, and the controversial role that patents play in 
innovation dynamics, the UK Government insists that patents 
have a strong link to ongoing high-tech R&D and must thus 
be incentivised in order for the UK to have innovation-led 
growth. Thus in October 2010 Osborne announced a patent 
box policy, due to begin in 2013, which would reduce the rate of 
corporation tax on the income derived from patents (to 10 per 
cent). This of course fits with the current government’s belief 
that investment and innovation can be easily nudged via taxes.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) has argued against 
this policy, claiming that the only effect it will have is to reduce 
government tax revenue (by a large amount) without affecting 
innovation. It is argued that R&D tax credits are enough to 
address the market failure issue around R&D, and that the 
patent box policy is instead poorly targeted at research, as the 
policy targets the income that results from patented technology, 
not the research itself (a similar claim we make around R&D 
tax credits when they are not subject to control). A recent 
report by the IFS claims:
Once a patent is in place, a firm has a monopoly on the use of those 
ideas, and so can capture all of the returns and therefore faces 
the correct incentives to maximise the related income stream. In 
addition, to the extent that a Patent Box reduces the tax rate for 
activity that would have occurred in the absence of government 
intervention, the policy includes a large deadweight cost.58
Furthermore, the authors claim that the patent box 
policy will also add complexity to the tax system and require 
expensive policing to ensure that income and costs are 
being appropriately assigned to patents. They claim that the 
great uncertainty and time lags behind creating patentable 
technologies will counteract the incentives, and since 
international collaborations are increasingly common, there is 
no guarantee that the extra research that is incentivised will be 
conducted in the UK.59
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This chapter shows that many of the assumptions that 
underlie growth policy should not necessarily be taken for 
granted. Over the last decade or so, policy makers searching 
for proxies for economic growth have alighted on things they 
can measure such as R&D spend, patents, venture capital 
activity, and the number of small firms that are assumed to be 
important for growth. We have attempted to demystify these 
assumptions and now turn to the largest myth of all: the limited 
role for government in producing entrepreneurship, innovation 
and growth.
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2  Beyond market failures
 
 
 
 
In response to the 2007/08 financial crisis, fiscal consolidation 
is occurring in national economies across the globe. These 
‘cuts’ have two core stated objectives.
The first objective, most commonly heard in the media, 
is to reduce the fiscal deficit. This is seen as a danger to the 
economy, putting at risk the reputation of national bonds, 
giving rise to increases in interest rates, which then set off 
a downward spiral of falling investment, employment and 
consumption. It is also seen as unfair to future generations, 
which will be forced to pay high rates of interest for the 
irresponsibility of the current generation.
The second objective is about making the economy 
more competitive, entrepreneurial and innovative. The idea 
is that while government spending may be needed to provide 
basic infrastructure (schools, hospitals, roads) and — for 
Keynesians — to stabilise GDP, by cutting back on public 
sector spending the private sector can ‘step in’ and allow the 
economy to take off. This is not just because government 
spending supposedly ‘crowds out’ the savings that can fund 
private sector spending (a concept with little foundation when 
an economy is growing),60 but also because private sector 
investment is assumed to lead to a more efficient, dynamic and 
innovative economy. The assumption is that private companies 
are inherently more productive than state-run initiatives. So 
expanding the former and downsizing the latter will make 
the economy more productive and competitive. The fiscal 
deficit will fall as a result of the smaller size of the state, 
but also because of the higher tax receipts that follow from 
the ensuing growth, even where rates of tax are lowered to 
promote competitiveness.
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In this respect the Big Society programme of the UK’s 
Coalition Government is based on the idea that the state 
should be made smaller not only to reduce the deficit but 
because its presence in the economy impedes innovation 
and dynamism. By allowing local communities to have more 
control of their resources and decisions, free from the heavy 
hand of big government, initiatives under the Big Society 
programme, for example free schools, which are run by local 
parents and self-help groups, will lead to higher quality, 
more dynamism and more choice. Schools will become more 
‘innovative’. Without this assumption, the Big Society is only 
about cuts, something the government has insisted it is not.
The rhetorical assumption behind all of this is that the 
role of the state is negative rather than positive. It depicts the 
state as less productive (by definition) than the private — or 
voluntary — sector. This pamphlet shows that there is an 
alternative interpretation of the role of the state, at least in 
innovation policy, that hotly contests such a view. In this 
section we explore the role of the state to push forward the 
boundaries of technological advance through investment 
in basic science. Although less contested — the Coalition 
Government’s 2010 spending review protected the £4.6 billion 
science budget at least in cash terms — it shows that many 
of the innovations that we presume to be a tribute to the 
dynamism of the market are actually the product of public 
sector choices.
The debate about what type of research is best conducted 
by the public or private sector tends to come down to a 
discussion of the long time horizons necessary (eg for ‘basic’ 
research) and the public good nature of the investment in 
question (making it difficult for businesses to appropriate 
returns), providing the rationale for public sector funding.61 
This is the classic market failure argument. What is less 
understood is the fact that often public sector funding ends 
up doing much more than fixing market failures. By being 
more willing to engage in the world of Knightian uncertainty, 
investing in early stage developments, for example dreaming 
up the possibility of the internet or nanotech when the 
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terms did not even exist, it in fact creates new products and 
related markets. It leads the growth process rather than just 
incentivising or stabilising it.
What type of risk?
Entrepreneurship, like growth, is one of the least understood 
topics in economics. What is it? According to the Austrian 
economist Joseph Schumpeter, an entrepreneur is a person, 
or group of people, who is willing and able to convert  
a new idea or invention into a successful innovation.  
It is not just about setting up a new business (the more 
common definition), but doing so in a way that produces 
a new product, or a new process, or a new market for an 
existing product or process. Entrepreneurship, he wrote, 
employs ‘the gale of creative destruction’ to replace in 
whole or in part inferior innovations across markets and 
industries, simultaneously creating new products including 
new business models, and in so doing destroying the lead 
of the incumbents.62 In this way, creative destruction is 
largely responsible for the dynamism of industries and 
long-run economic growth. Each major new technology 
leads to creative destruction: the steam engine, the railway, 
electricity, electronics, the car, the computer, the internet 
have all destroyed as much as they have created but led to 
increased wealth overall.
For Frank H Knight and Peter Drucker 
entrepreneurship is about taking risk.63 The behaviour of 
the entrepreneur is that of a person willing to put his or her 
career and financial security on the line and take risks in the 
name of an idea, spending much time as well as capital on an 
uncertain venture.
In fact, entrepreneurial risk-taking, like technological 
change, is not just risky, it is highly ‘uncertain’. Knight 
distinguished risk from uncertainty in the following way:
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and 
uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome 
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in a group of instances is known… While in the case of uncertainty 
that is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to 
form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a 
high degree unique.64 
John Maynard Keynes also emphasised these differences:
By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to 
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. 
The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty…The 
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of 
a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of 
interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention… 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know!  65
Technological change is a good example of the truly 
unique situation since R&D investments not only take years 
to materialise into new products, but most lead to failure. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, for example, innovation takes 
up to 17 years from the beginning of an R&D project to the 
end; it costs about $403 million per drug; and the failure 
rate is extremely high: only 1 in 10,000 compounds reach 
market approval phase, a success rate of 0.01 per cent. 
When successful, often the search for one product leads to 
the discovery of a completely different one. The process is 
characterised by serendipity.66 This of course does not mean 
that innovation is based on luck. Far from it, it is based on 
long-term strategies and targeted investments. But the returns 
from those investments are highly uncertain and thus cannot 
be understood through rational economic theory (as will 
be seen below, this is one of the critiques that modern day 
Schumpeterians make of endogenous growth theory, which 
models R&D as a game-theoretic choice). Furthermore, the 
ability of companies to engage in innovation differs greatly 
and is one of the main reasons that firms are so different 
from each other, and why it is nearly impossible to find 
firms distributed ‘normally’ around an ‘optimal size firm’ 
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(the ‘representative’ agent), a concept so dear to neoclassical 
microeconomic theory.
The high risk and serendipitous characteristic of the 
innovation process is one of the main reasons why profit-
maximising companies will invest less in basic research 
and more in applied research, because of the greater and 
more immediate returns from the latter. Investment in basic 
research is a typical example of a ‘market failure’ where 
the market alone would not produce enough basic research 
so the government must step in. This is why there are few 
people, on all sides of the political spectrum, who would 
not agree that it should be (and is) the state that tends to 
fund most basic research. For the US economy, for example, 
figures 3 and 4 show that while government spending on 
R&D makes up only 26 per cent of total R&D, with the 
private sector making up 67 per cent, the proportion is much 
higher when basic research is considered in isolation. Indeed 
public spending accounts for 57 per cent of basic research in 
the USA, with the private sector taking on only 18 per cent.
Source: National Science Foundation 67
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A core difference between the USA and Europe is 
the degree to which public R&D spending is for ‘general 
advancement’ rather than mission-oriented. Market failure 
theories of R&D are more useful to understand general 
‘advancement of knowledge’ type R&D than that which is 
more ‘mission-oriented’ — R&D investment which is targeted 
to support a government agency programme, for example 
in defence, space, agriculture, health, energy or industrial 
technology. And while public R&D spent on general 
advancement usually makes up less than 50 per cent of total 
R&D, in 2003/04 mission-oriented R&D made up more than 
60 per cent of public R&D spending in South Korea, the USA, 
the UK, France, Canada, Japan and Germany.69
Mowery argues that trying to cut and paste lessons 
learned from one mission-oriented programme to another is 
dangerous as each one has its own specificities (eg defence vs 
health). And for understanding these differences, he argues 
the innovation systems approach (reviewed below) is much 
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more useful than the market failure approach, because it is 
able to take into consideration how each sector and nation has 
its own dynamics, and how each mission is defined by specific 
structures, institutions and incentives.
Another important issue in the comparison between 
European Union (EU) countries and the USA is the so called 
European Paradox — the conjecture that EU countries play a 
leading global role in top-level scientific output, but lag behind 
in the ability to convert this strength into wealth-generating 
innovations. Dosi, Llerena and Labini provide evidence 
that the reason for European weaknesses is not the lack of 
science parks and interaction between education and industry, 
as is commonly claimed, but a weaker system of scientific 
research and weaker and less innovative companies.70 Policy 
implications include less emphasis on ‘networking’ and more 
on policy measures aimed to strengthen ‘frontier’ research 
or, put another way, a better division of labour between 
universities and companies, where universities should focus on 
high level research and firms on technology development.
State leading in radical innovation
A key reason why the concept of market failure is problematic 
in understanding the role of government in the innovation 
process is that it ignores a fundamental fact about the history 
of innovation. Not only has government funded the riskiest 
research, whether applied or basic, but it has indeed often 
been the source of the most radical, path-breaking types of 
innovation. To this extent it has actively created markets not 
just fixed them. We will examine this more in depth below 
in chapter 4 with examples of the leading role that the state 
played from the development of internet technology to 
nanotechnology, but here we will consider what it means for 
our understanding of the link between R&D and growth, and 
the public–private divide.
Not all innovations lead to economy-wide growth. 
This is only true for new products or processes that have an 
impact on a wide variety of sectors in the economy, as was the 
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case with the rise with electricity and computers. These are 
what economists call general purpose technologies (GPTs) 
characterised by three core qualities, pervasive, improvement 
and innovation spawning:
• They are pervasive in that they spread to many sectors.
• They get better over time and, hence, should keep lowering  
the costs of its users.
• Make it easier to invent and produce new products  
or processes.
Ruttan argues that large scale and long term government 
investment has been the engine behind almost every GPT 
in the last century. He analysed the development of six 
different technology complexes (the US ‘mass production’ 
system, aviation technologies, space technologies, information 
technology, internet technologies and nuclear power) and 
concluded that government investments have been important 
in bringing these new technologies into being, and that 
nuclear power would, most probably, not have been developed 
at all in the absence of large government investments in 
development. In each case it was not just funding innovation, 
and creating the right conditions for it, but also envisioning 
the opportunity space, engaging in the most risky and 
uncertain early research, and overseeing the commercialisation 
process.71 In chapter 4 we will show this has also been the case 
for the recent development of nanotechnology, which many 
believe is the next GPT.
At a more micro level, Block and Keller find that between 
1971 and 2006, 77 out of the most important 88 innovations 
(rated by R&D Magazine’s annual awards) were found to have 
been fully dependent on federal support, especially, but not 
only, in the early phases.72
These examples are fundamental for understanding the 
impact of publicly funded research. It is not just about funding 
blue sky research but creating visions around new important 
technologies. To illustrate the general point, we turn now to 
the specific examples of early-stage government investment 
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into the US pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors.
The pharmaceutical industry is interesting because of 
the new division of innovative labour. Large pharma, small 
biotech, universities and government labs are all parts of the 
ecology, but it is especially government labs and government 
backed universities that invest in the research responsible for 
producing the most radical new drugs — the new molecular 
entities with priority rating in figure 6. Private pharma has 
focused more on ‘me too’ drugs (slight variations of existing 
ones) and the development (including clinical trials) and 
marketing side. This is of course highly ironic, given this 
sector’s constant bemoaning of ‘stifling’ regulations. The ex-
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, Marcia Angell, 
has argued forcefully that while private pharmaceutical 
companies justify their exorbitantly high prices by saying 
they are due to their high R&D costs, in fact it has been state 
funded labs and research that are responsible for two-thirds of 
the new molecular entities that have been discovered in the last 
ten years.73
Economists measure productivity by comparing the 
amount of input into production with the amount of output 
that emerges. In this sense the large pharmaceutical companies 
have been fairly unproductive over the last few years in the 
production of innovations. As figure 5 shows there has been 
an exponential rise in R&D spending by members of the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) with no corresponding increase in the number 
of new drugs, commonly known as new molecular entities 
(NMEs). Figure 6 shows that this also holds for patenting: 
while the number of patents has skyrocketed since the 
Bayh-Dole Act (1980) allowed publicly funded research to 
be patented, most of these patents are of little value. When 
patents are weighted by the amount of citations they receive 
(the common indicator of ‘important’ patents), the figure is 
relatively flat — there are few important patents.
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Between 1993 and 2004, of the 1,072 drugs approved by 
the FDA, only 357 were NMEs rather than just variations of 
existing ‘me too’ drugs. The number of important ‘priority’ new 
drugs is even more worrying: only 146 of these had priority 
rating (NME with P rating). In figure 7 we see that only 14 per 
cent were seen as important new drugs.
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For the sake of the argument being made in this 
pamphlet, what is important is that 75 per cent of the NMEs 
trace their research not to private companies but to National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), publicly funded labs in the USA or 
other public labs across the globe, such as the MRC in the UK. 
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So while the state-funded labs have invested in the most risky 
phase, the big pharmaceutical companies have preferred to 
invest in the less risky variations of existing drugs (a drug that 
simply has a different dosage than a previous version of the 
same drug).
All a far cry, for example, from the recent quote by 
UK based GlaxoSmithKline 76 CEO Andrew Witty: ‘The 
pharmaceutical industry is hugely innovative… If governments 
work to support, not stifle, innovation, the industry will deliver 
the next era of revolutionary medicine.’ 77
Biotechnology: public leader private laggard
In the UK, the MRC receives annual ‘grant-in-aid’ funding 
from Parliament through the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS). It is government funded, though 
independent in its choice of which research to support. It 
works closely with the Department of Health and other UK 
research councils, industry and other stakeholders to identify 
and respond to the UK’s health needs. It was MRC research 
in the 1970s that led to the development of monoclonal 
antibodies — which, according to the MRC, make up a third 
of all new drug treatments for many different major diseases 
around cancer, arthritis and asthma.
A similar story can be told for the US biopharmaceutical 
industry. Its growth was not, as is often claimed, rooted in 
business finance (such as venture capital), but rather emerged 
and was guided by government investment and spending.78 
In fact, the immense interest of venture capital and big 
pharmaceutical companies in biotech was paradoxical given 
the industry’s risky and lengthy process of recouping its 
investment.79 According to Lazonick and Tulum, the answer to 
this ‘puzzle’ is two-fold.80 First, there has been the availability of 
an easy exit opportunity for early investors through speculative 
stock market flotations in which investors are motivated to 
absorb the initial public offerings (IPOs). Second, there is the 
significant government support and involvement that has helped 
this industry to flourish over the last several decades.
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In fact, the development of the biotech industry in  
the USA is a direct product of the key role of the government 
in leading the development of the knowledge base that 
has thus provided firm success and the overall growth of 
the biotech industry. As Vallas, Kleinman and Biscotti 
eloquently summarise:
The knowledge economy did not spontaneously emerge from the 
bottom up, but was prompted by a top-down stealth industrial 
policy; government and industry leaders simultaneously advocated 
government intervention to foster the development of the 
biotechnology industry and argued hypocritically that government 
should ‘let the free market work’.81
As this quote indicates, not only was this knowledge 
economy guided by government, but, strikingly, it was done 
as the leaders of industry were on the one hand privately 
demanding government intervention to facilitate the industry’s 
development, and on the other hand publicly declaring 
their support for a free market. It is no wonder given this 
hypocrisy that so much confusion now exists among policy 
makers and the general public regarding the development of 
economic innovation, resulting in the failure to recognise the 
significance of government involvement. Given the efforts of 
international policy makers in seeking to advance their own 
economies and in replicating the successes of the USA, it is 
imperative now, more than ever, that the ‘real’ story of this 
innovation and economic growth and development be told.
Summarising their findings of the strong role of the 
government in the development of the biotech industry, Vallas, 
Kleinman and Biscotti emphasise the significance of ‘massive 
shifts in federal R&D that were involved’. They go on to add, 
‘It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the knowledge 
economy was not born but made.’ Though pharmaceutical 
companies spend much on R&D, supplementing these private 
investments has been completely dependent on a ‘ready supply 
of scientific knowledge that has been either funded or actually 
produced by federal agencies’.82
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The National Institutes of Health:  
creating the wave versus surfing it
State support and involvement in biotech span a wide range 
of forms, the most significant being that the enormous 
knowledge base which biopharmaceutical companies 
are dependent on has developed more from government 
investment than from business. This knowledge base has 
been developed from the critical investment the government 
has given to funding basic science. At the forefront of this 
lies the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other 
government programmes which have invested in many of 
the key scientific achievements that the industry’s success 
has been built on. Drawing on NIH spending data compiled 
in Lazonick and Tulum, it is easy to see how crucial this 
funding was for biotech innovation. From 1978 to 2004, NIH 
spending on life sciences research totalled $365 billion in 
2004. Every year from 1970 to 2009, with the exception of 
a small decline in 2006, NIH funding increased in nominal 
terms, in contrast to the widely fluctuating funds from 
venture capital and stock market investments.83
From the NIH’s formation in 1938 through 2010, a total 
$738 billion in 2010 was invested by the US government, and 
by extension US taxpayers, into the pharmaceutical industry. 
More striking is that, through 2010, in the 35 years since the 
founding of Genentech as the first biotech company in 1976, 
NIH funded $624 billion in 2010 to the biotech industry. As 
evidenced in this data, Lazonick and Tulum argue that the 
US government, through the NIH, and by extension via the 
US taxpayer, ‘has long been the nation’s (and the world’s) 
most important investor in knowledge creation in the 
medical fields’.84 This knowledge base was ‘indispensable’ 
and without it, venture capital and public equity funds 
would not have poured into the industry. They have ‘surfed 
the wave’ rather than created it.
Through a system of nearly 50,000 competitive grants, 
the NIH supports more than 325,000 researchers at over 
3,000 universities, medical schools, and other research 
institutions in every US state and throughout the world. 
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These grants represent 80 per cent of the agency’s budget 
with another 10 per cent used to directly employ 6,000 
individuals in its own laboratories. The agency’s 26 research 
centres in Maryland serve a prominent role in the biotech 
industry — one that is increasing as more centres and 
institutes continue to develop within NIH. Beyond these 
‘knowledge-creating programmes’, traces of government 
support can also be seen in almost every single major 
biopharmaceutical product in the USA.85 Although many 
biotech scholars acknowledge the immense government 
support in the science base, overall they fail to draw the 
causal relationship between the successful growth of this 
industry, its attractiveness and the long lasting government 
efforts to develop and sustain the substantial knowledge base 
in this country.
So why does venture capital often get so much credit 
for creating the biotech revolution? The story of private and 
public investments in biotech is perfectly described by the 
following newspaper story:
During a recent visit to the United States, French President 
Francois Mitterrand stopped to tour California’s Silicon 
Valley, where he hoped to learn more about the ingenuity and 
entrepreneurial drive that gave birth to so many companies there. 
Over lunch, Mitterrand listened as Thomas Perkins, a partner in 
the venture capital fund that started Genentech Inc., extolled the 
virtues of the risk-taking investors who finance the entrepreneurs. 
Perkins was cut off by Stanford University Professor Paul Berg, 
who won a Nobel Prize for work in genetic engineering. He asked, 
‘Where were you guys in the 50s and 60s when all the funding had 
to be done in the basic science? Most of the discoveries that have 
fuelled [the industry] were created back then.’ 86
The point of this chapter is to show that the case for 
state investment goes beyond blue skies basic research. 
In fact, it applies to all the different types of ‘risky’ and 
uncertain research since the private sector is in many ways 
less entrepreneurial than the public sector: it shies away 
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from radically new products and processes, leaving the most 
uncertain investments to be first taken on by the state. So while 
blue skies research is necessary for innovation to occur, it is 
far from sufficient, and indeed the role of the state goes far 
wider. We examine the breadth and depth of state leadership in 
producing the knowledge economy in chapters 3 and 4.
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3  National systems  
of innovation 
 
 
In chapter 1 we learned that the relationship between R&D 
and growth is dependent on firm-specific conditions, with most 
firms not receiving any growth benefit if those conditions are 
not in place. One of the most important literatures that have 
illustrated why ‘R&D is not enough’ is the work on national 
systems of innovation. In this view it is not the quantity of 
R&D that matters but how it is distributed throughout an 
economy, and often the crucial role of the state in achieving 
this. This perspective emerges from the ‘Schumpeterian’ 
literature on the economics of innovation, which emphasises 
the Knightian uncertainty that characterises innovation, as 
discussed in chapter 1.87
Schumpetarian economists criticise endogenous growth 
theory because of its assumption that R&D can be modelled as 
a lottery where a certain amount of R&D investment will create 
a certain probability for successful innovation. They argue that 
in fact innovation is an example of true Knightian uncertainty, 
not able to be modelled through a normal probability 
distribution that is implicit in the ‘R&D game’ literature.88 By 
highlighting the strong uncertainty underlying technological 
innovation, and very strong feedback effects between 
innovation, growth and market structure, Schumpetarians 
emphasise the ‘systems’ component of technological progress 
and growth.89 Systems of innovation are defined as ‘the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors 
whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and 
diffuse new technologies’,90 or ‘the elements and relationships 
which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, 
and economically useful, knowledge… and are either located 
within or rooted inside the borders of a nation State’.91
National systems of innovation 
The emphasis here is not on the stock of R&D but on 
the circulation of knowledge and its diffusion throughout 
the economy. Institutional change is not assessed through 
criteria based on static allocative efficiency but rather on 
how it promotes technological and structural change. 
The perspective is neither macro or micro, but more meso, 
where individual firms are seen as part of a broader network 
of firms with whom they cooperate and compete. The system 
of innovation can be inter-firm, regional, national or global. 
The network is the unit of analysis (not the firm) in the 
meso perspective. The network consists of customers, 
subcontractors, infrastructure, suppliers; competencies or 
functions; and links or relationships. The point is that the 
competencies for innovation are distributed throughout a 
network of actors and their links or relationships.92
The causation is not ‘linear’ — from science to large 
scale R&D to applications and innovations. Rather it is 
full of feedback loops from market to technology, and 
from applications to science. In the linear model, the R&D 
system is seen as the main source of innovation, reinforcing 
economists’ use of R&D stats to understand growth. In this 
more non-linear view, the roles of education, training, design 
and quality control are just as important. Furthermore, it is 
better able to take into account serendipity and uncertainty 
that characterises the innovation process. It is useful for 
understanding the rise and fall of different powers in economic 
history. For example it explains the rise of Germany in the 
nineteenth century to its technological education and training 
systems, and the role of the state in fostering these. And it 
points to the rise of the USA in the twentieth century as related 
to the rise of mass production and in-house R&D. All of these 
stories are different in the specifics but share a common seed 
of having a system of innovation rather than a simple focus on 
R&D spend in itself.
The general point can be illustrated by contrasting the 
experience of Japan with that of the then Soviet Union in the 
1970s and 1980s. The rise of Japan is explained by the way that 
new knowledge flowed through a more horizontal structure 
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between ministries of science, academia and company R&D. 
In the 1970s Japan was spending 2.5 per cent of its GDP on 
R&D while the Soviet Union was spending more than 4 per 
cent. Yet Japan eventually grew much faster than the Soviet 
Union because the R&D was spread across a wider variety 
of sectors, not just military and space as in the Soviet Union. 
In Japan, there was a strong integration of R&D, production 
and import of technology at the enterprise level, whereas 
in the Soviet Union there was separation. Crucially, the 
Soviet Union did not have, or permit, business enterprises 
that could commercialise the knowledge developed by the 
state. Japan had strong user–producer linkages, which were 
nonexistent in the Soviet system; and incentives to innovate 
were encouraged throughout management and the workforce, 
rather than focused only in the ministries of science. It was 
the Japanese government’s industrial policy that coordinated 
these attributes guided by the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI). Equally important were the lessons 
learned by Japanese companies, which sent people abroad to 
learn about Western technologies. These companies benefitted 
from the US ‘developmental state’ and then transferred that 
knowledge to Japanese companies. Japanese companies were 
among the first foreign companies to license the transistor 
from BAT&T (Bell Labs) in the early 1950s. Key connections 
were made with Western companies such as GE, IBM, HP 
and Xerox. Particular sectors like electronics were targeted 
forcefully, and the organisational innovation embodied in the 
flexible ‘just-in-time’ production system was applied to a wide 
variety of sectors.
Table 2 compares the Japanese and Soviet systems of 
innovation. It is important in this context to highlight that 
MITI’s industrial policy was beyond the ‘picking winners’ 
idea that so many opposers today of industrial policy 
cite. It was about coordinating intra-industrial change, 
inter-sectoral linkages, inter-company linkages, and the 
private–public space in a way that allowed growth to occur 
in a holistic targeted manner. The vertical ‘Fordist’ model of 
production in the USA, characterised by rigidity and tense 
National systems of innovation 
relations between trade unions and management, caused 
a more rigid flow of knowledge and competencies in the 
economy, again giving an advantage to the more horizontally 
structured and flexible Japanese firms.
Table 2  Contrasting national systems of innovation:  
   Japan and the USSR in the 1970s
In this context, regional systems of innovation focus 
on the cultural, geographical and institutional proximity 
that create and facilitate transactions among socio-economic 
actors. Studies focusing on innovative milieu such as industrial 
Japan USSR
High gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D (GERD)/GNP ratio (2.5%)
Very high GERD/GNP ratio (c 4%)
Very low proportion of military or 
space R&D (<2% of R&D)
Extremely high proportion of military 
or space R&D (>70% of R&D)
High proportion of total R&D at 
enterprise level and company-
financed (approx 67%)
Low proportion of total R&D at 
enterprise level and company-
financed (<10%)
Strong integration of R&D, production 
and import of technology ex 
enterprise level
Separation of R&D, production and 
import of technology and weak 
institutional linkages
Strong user–producer and 
subcontractor network linkages
Weak or non-existent linkages 
between marketing, production and 
procurement
Strong incentives to innovate 
at enterprise level involving 
management and workforce
Some incentives to innovate made 
increasingly strong in 1960s and 
1970s but offset by other negative 
disincentives affecting management 
and workforce
Intensive experience of competition in 
international markets
Relatively weak exposure to 
international competition except in 
arms race
Source: Freeman, 1995 93
Note: Gross domestic expenditures on research and development (GERD) are all 
monies expended on R&D performed within the country in a given year.
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districts and local systems of innovation have demonstrated 
that conventions and specific socio-institutional factors 
in regions affect technological change at a national level. 
Specific factors might include interactions between local 
administrations, unions and family owned companies in, for 
example, the Italian industrial districts.
Government’s role in not only creating knowledge 
(through national labs and universities) but also mobilising 
resources, and allowing knowledge and innovations to diffuse 
across sectors and the economy, is key in this view, either 
through existing networks or by facilitating new ones.
Our view, however, is that having a national system of 
innovation, rich in horizontal as well as vertical networks, 
is not sufficient in itself. The state has a further role to play 
to lead the process of industrial development, developing 
strategies for technological advance in priority areas.
This has been accepted as consensus in countries that are 
attempting to catch up with most technologically advanced. 
There is a whole literature devoted to the role of the so-called 
‘developmental state’, where the state is active not only in 
Keynesian demand management but also in leading the process 
of industrialisation. The most typical examples are the East 
Asian economies, which through planning and active industrial 
policy were able to ‘catch up’ technologically and economically 
with the west.94 In states that were late to industrialise, the state 
itself led the industrialisation drive — it took on developmental 
functions, for example by targeting certain sectors for 
investment, and putting up barriers to foreign competition 
until such time as companies in the targeted sectors were ready 
to export, and then provided assistance to finding new export 
markets. In Japan, for example, Johnson illustrates how MITI 
worked to coordinate Japanese firms in new international 
markets.95 This occurred through investments in particular 
technologies (picking winners), with specific business strategies 
to win in particular markets, domestically and internationally. 
Furthermore, the Japanese state coordinated finance through 
the Bank of Japan as well as through the Fiscal Investment 
Loan Program (funded by the postal savings system).
National systems of innovation 
Chang offers similar illustrations for South Korea and 
other recently emerged economies.96 China too has engaged 
in a very targeted industrialisation strategy, which showed the 
weaknesses of the Washington consensus on development by 
only joining the World Trade Organization once its industries 
were ready to compete, rather than as part of an International 
Monetary Fund-backed industrialisation strategy, which 
often denies the state the active role that it played in the 
development of the industrialised nations (USA, Germany 
and the UK).
If there is strong evidence that the state can be effective 
in pursuing targeted catch-up policies by focusing resources 
on being dominant in certain industrial sectors, why is it 
not accepted that the state can have a greater role in the 
development of new technologies and applications beyond 
simply funding basic science and having an infrastructure to 
support private sector activity?
The entrepreneurial state
The argument of this pamphlet is that the state can be far more 
proactive in spurring industrial innovation at the forefront 
of knowledge than is currently understood by policy makers. 
Just as developing nations can successfully plan to catch up 
with Western nations, so any state can spur the development 
of technological solutions and/or the furtherance of practical 
knowledge in a given sector simply by catalysing a networked 
economy to engage in multiple innovations.
Unlike in a developing economy, where the technology 
is already available elsewhere in the world, an entrepreneurial 
state does not yet know what the details of the innovation are, 
but it knows a general area that is ripe for development, or 
where pushing the boundaries of knowledge are desirable.  
The state welcomes and engages with Knightian uncertainty for 
the exploration and production of new products which lead to 
economic growth.
It has done so not just by funding basic research. More 
importantly, it has taken the lead by formulating a vision of a 
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new area (for example the internet or the genetic sequence); 
investing in the earliest-stage research and development which 
the private sector is unable or unwilling to do (for example 
when the market prefers to invest in safe ‘me too’ medicines 
rather than risky new molecular entities); identifying and 
supporting multiple new paths and adjusting rules to promote 
them (for example changes in regulation that allow publicly 
funded research to be patented); creating and funding 
networks that bring together business, academia and finance 
(for example SBIR in the USA); and being constantly ahead 
of the game in areas that will drive the next decades of growth 
(for example nanotechnology and green technology today).
It will also, at a time when the economic crisis has given 
risk and speculation a bad name, distinguish between good 
speculation and bad speculation. Speculation is needed 
when the probability of failure is so high.97 The state has in 
fact been an important source of Schumpeterian risk and 
speculation — the bold courage required to delve into the world 
of uncertainty needed to create new products and processes 
that can transform long-run economic growth. Thus good 
risk is the speculation needed for the sake of innovation and 
structural change rather than speculation for… the sake 
of speculation — profit on short-term price changes. This 
‘entrepreneurial’ risk-taking role is something that neither 
the economics of Keynesian stimulus nor the policies behind 
the Schumpeterian national systems of innovation have 
elaborated. And this is one of the reasons why the current 
international debate about post-crisis recovery and growth is 
often so full of rhetoric about the private–public divide, on 
both the conservative and progressive sides of the spectrum.
The next chapter argues that despite the perception of 
the USA as the epitome of private-sector led wealth creation, 
in reality the state has been engaged on a massive scale in 
entrepreneurial risk-taking to spur innovation. Four main 
examples are given: the roles of DARPA, SBIR, the Orphan 
Drug Act and the National Nanotechnology Initiative in 
the USA (the EU passed its own Orphan Drug Act in 2001, 
imitating the US Act passed in 1983). What they share is a 
National systems of innovation 
proactive approach by the state to shape a market in order 
to drive innovation. The insight is that as well as being an 
entrepreneurial society, a place where it is culturally natural to 
start and grow a business, the USA is also a place where the 
government itself is entrepreneurial, commissioning high-
level innovative private-sector activity in pursuit of public 
policy goals.
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4  The US  
entrepreneurial state 
 
 
So far we have established that while the level of technological 
innovation is integral to the rate of economic growth, there is 
no linear relationship between R&D spend, size of companies, 
number of patents and the level of innovation in an economy. 
What does seem to be clear, however, is that a necessary 
precursor for innovation to occur is to have a highly networked 
economy, with continuous feedback loops between different 
individuals and organisations to enable knowledge to be 
shared and its boundaries to be pushed back. This is what has 
been called in the literature a national system of innovation.
This chapter attempts to illustrate that at the frontiers 
of knowledge, simply having the system of innovation is not 
enough. Over time, more impressive results can be achieved 
when the state is a major player operating within this system. 
This does not necessarily have to take place at a national level 
(although it can) and should not involve long-term subsidies to 
certain companies, as gave a bad name to the ‘picking winners’ 
experience. Rather the state, through its various agencies 
and laboratories, can be nimble, using its procurement, 
commissioning and regulatory functions to shape markets and 
drive technological advance. In this way it acts as a catalyst for 
change, the spark that lights the fire, in a networked system 
that already has the potential to disseminate new ideas rapidly.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
The history of the USA does not differ from other modern 
countries in the role that military engagement has had for 
economic growth and development. But in the USA, the 
experience of recent decades has been to apply those lessons 
to far greater application in wider industrial policy. The role 
The US entrepreneurial state
of government in the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) model goes far beyond simply funding basic 
science. It is about targeting resourcing in specific areas and 
directions; opening new windows of opportunities; brokering 
the interactions between public and private agents involved 
in technological development, including private and public 
venture capital; and facilitating commercialisation.98
In contrast to the emphasis placed on Franklin D 
Roosevelt’s New Deal by market fundamentalists as the critical 
turning point in US economic history, Block argues that the 
Second World War served a more significant period for the 
development of innovation policies in the USA. It was during 
the period following the Second World War that the Pentagon 
worked closely with other national security agencies like the 
Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Agency (NASA), which led to the development of 
technologies such as computers, jet planes, civilian nuclear 
energy, lasers and biotechnology.99 The way this was done 
was ‘pioneered’ by the Advanced Projects Research Agency 
(ARPA), an office created by the Pentagon in 1958. This agency, 
also commonly referred to as the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) (and consequently the acronym 
used throughout this pamphlet),100 engaged in developing 
critical initiatives across a broad range of technologies. 
However, it was the support for technological advancement 
in the computer field that led to the establishment of a new 
paradigm for technology policy.
DARPA was set up to give the USA technological 
superiority in different sectors, mainly but not only related 
to technology, and has always been aggressively mission 
oriented. It has a budget of more than $3 billion per year, 240 
staff, operates flexibly with few overheads, and is connected to 
but separated from government. It has successfully recruited 
high quality programme managers who are willing to take 
risks because of their short term contracts, which last anywhere 
between four and six years. Its structure is meant to bridge the 
gap between blue sky academic work, with long time horizons, and 
the more incremental technological development in the military.
77
After a Second World War victory that relied heavily on 
state-sponsored and organised technological developments 
the federal government was quick to implement the 
recommendations of Vannevar Bush’s 1945 report, which 
called for ongoing public support for basic as well as applied 
scientific research.101 The relationship between government and 
science was further strengthened by the Manhattan Project 
(the major scientific effort led by the USA, with the UK and 
Canada, which led to the atomic bomb in the Second World 
War), as physicists instructed policy makers on the military 
implications of new technology. From this point on, it became 
the government’s business to understand which technologies 
provided possible applications for military purposes as well as 
commercial use.
According to Block, during this period an increased 
number of government workers adopted a more direct role 
in advancing innovation through encouraging researchers to 
solve specific problems, procuring additional researchers and 
requiring that those researchers meet specific objectives.102 
The insight that followed was that this was something 
government could do for economic and civilian purposes, in 
addition to the traditional military function.
The launching of Sputnik in 1957 by the Soviets led to 
the eruption of panic among US policy makers, fearful that 
they were losing the technological battle. The creation of 
DARPA in 1958 was a direct result. Before the formation of 
DARPA the military was the sole controller of all military 
R&D dollars. Through the formation of DARPA a portion of 
military spending on R&D was now designated to ‘blue sky 
thinking’ — ideas that went beyond the horizon in that they 
may not produce results for ten or 20 years. As a result of this 
mandate DARPA was free to focus on advancing innovative 
technological development with novel strategies. This opened 
numerous windows for scientists and engineers to propose 
innovative ideas and receive funding and assistance.103
Going way beyond simply funding research, DARPA 
funded the formation of computer science departments, 
provided start-up firms with early research support, 
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contributed to semiconductor research and support to human 
computer interface research, and oversaw the early stages of 
the internet. Many of these critical activities were carried out 
by its Information Processing Techniques Office, originally 
established in 1962. Such strategies contributed hugely to 
the development of the computer industry during the 1960s 
and 1970s, and as a variety of research reveals, many of the 
technologies later incorporated in the design of the personal 
computer were developed by DARPA-funded researchers.
Another key event during this period was the new 
innovation environment that emerged after a group of 
scientists and engineers in 1957 broke away from a firm started 
by William Shockley.104 This rebellious group of scientists and 
engineers often referred to as the ‘traitorous eight’ went on to 
form a new firm that advanced semiconductor technology and 
continued ‘a process of economic fission that was constantly 
spinning off new economic challengers’. This spin-off 
business model became viable and popular for technological 
advancement following the 1957 revolt. A new paradigm 
emerged that resulted in innovative ideas moving from labs to 
the market in far greater quantity.
Before this government officials’ leverage in generating 
rapid technological advancement was limited as large defence 
firms still wielded tremendous power in deflecting pressure 
and demands for innovation. The leverage government 
officials had in advancing innovative breakthroughs was also 
limited by the small number of firms with such capabilities. 
Bonded by a shared interest in avoiding the certain risks that 
accompanied following an uncertain technological path, the 
firms resisted government pressure for innovation. However, 
in a new environment with ambitious start-ups the opportunity 
for generating real competition among firms presented itself 
more fully.
Programme officers at DARPA recognised the potential 
this new innovation environment provided and were able to 
take advantage of it focusing at first on new, smaller firms 
to whom they could provide much smaller funds than was 
possible with the larger defence contractors. These firms 
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recognised the need for ambitious innovation as part of their 
overall future viability. With small, newer firms engaged 
in real competition and as the spin-off model became more 
institutionalised, Block notes that large firms also had to get 
on board with this quest for rapid innovative breakthroughs.105 
By taking advantage of this new environment, the government 
was able to play a leading role in mobilising innovation 
among big and small firms, and in university and government 
laboratories. The dynamic and flexible structure of DARPA in 
contrast to the more formal and bureaucratic structure of other 
government programmes allowed it to maximise the increased 
leverage it now had in generating real competition across 
the network. Using its funding networks, DARPA increased 
the flow of knowledge across competing research groups. It 
facilitated workshops for researchers to gather and share ideas 
while also learning of the paths identified as ‘dead ends’ by 
others. DARPA officers engaged in business and technological 
brokering — linking university researchers to entrepreneurs 
interested in starting a new firm; connecting start-up 
firms with venture capitalists; finding a larger company to 
commercialise the technology; or assisting in procuring a 
government contract to support the commercialisation process.
Pursuing this brokering function, DARPA officers not only 
developed links among those involved in the network system 
but also engaged in efforts to expand the pool of scientists and 
engineers working in specific areas. An example of this is the 
role DARPA played in the 1960s by funding the establishment of 
new computer science departments at various universities in the 
USA. By increasing the number of researchers who possessed 
the necessary and particular expertise, DARPA was able, over 
an extended period of time, to accelerate technological change 
in this area. In the area of computer chip fabrication during the 
1970s, DARPA assumed the expenses associated with getting 
a design into a prototype by funding a laboratory affiliated 
with the University of Southern California. Anyone who 
possessed a superior design for a new microchip could have the 
chips fabricated at this laboratory, thus expanding the pool of 
participants designing faster and better microchips.
The US entrepreneurial state
The personal computer emerged during this time with 
Apple introducing the first one in 1976. Following this, the 
computer industry’s boom in Silicon Valley and the key role 
of DARPA in the massive growth of personal computing 
received significant attention, but has since been forgotten 
by those who claim Silicon Valley is an example of ‘free 
market’ capitalism.
Also during the 1970s the significant developments 
taking place in biotechnology illustrated to policy makers 
that the role of DARPA in the computer industry was not a 
unique or isolated case of success. The decentralised form of 
industrial policy that played such a crucial role in setting the 
context for the dramatic expansion of personal computing was 
also instrumental in accelerating growth and development in 
biotechnology.
Block identifies the four key characteristics of the 
DARPA model:106
A series of relatively small offices, often staffed with 
leading scientists and engineers, are given considerable 
budget autonomy to support promising ideas. These offices 
are proactive rather than reactive and work to set an agenda 
for researchers in the field. The goal is to create a scientific 
community with a presence in universities, the public sector 
and corporations that focuses on specific technological 
challenges that have to be overcome.
Funding is provided to a mix of university-based 
researchers, start-up firms, established firms and industry 
consortia. There is no dividing line between ‘basic research’ 
and ‘applied research’, since the two are deeply intertwined. 
Moreover, the DARPA personnel are encouraged to cut 
off funding to groups that were not making progress and 
reallocate resources to other groups that have more promise.
Since the goal is to produce usable technological 
advances, the agency’s mandate extends to helping firms get 
products to the stage of commercial viability. This can involve 
the agency in providing firms with assistance that goes well 
beyond research funding.
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Part of the agency’s task is to use its oversight role to 
make constructive linkages of ideas, resources and people 
across the different research and development sites.
The main focus is to assist firms in developing new 
product and process innovations. The key here is that the 
government serves as a leader for firms to imitate, an approach 
that is much more ‘hands on’ in that public sector officials are 
working directly with firms in identifying and pursuing the 
most promising innovative paths.
The Small Business Innovation Research 
programme
Contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the domination 
of free market ideology during the Reagan Administration, 
the US government in the 1980s, in fact, acted to build on 
the successes of DARPA’s decentralised industrial policy. 
One of the most significant events during this period was 
the signing of the Small Business Innovation Development 
Act by Reagan in 1982, as a consortium between the Small 
Business Administration and different government agencies 
like the Department of Defence, Department of Energy 
and Environmental Protection Agency. The Act was based 
on a National Science Foundation (NSF) pilot programme 
initiated during the Carter administration. The Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) programme required government 
agencies with large research budgets to designate a fraction 
(originally 1.25 per cent) of their research funding to support 
initiatives of small, independent, for-profit firms. The 
programme has provided support to a significant number of 
highly innovative start-up firms.107
In addition, the network of state and local institutions 
that worked in partnership with the federal programmes 
was expanded. An example of this is the development 
of organisations that were funded by state and local 
governments to assist entrepreneurs in submitting successful 
applications to the SBIR programme to secure funds for 
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their projects. The SBIR programme fulfils a unique role in 
this new innovation system, because it serves as the first place 
many entrepreneurs involved in technological innovation 
go for funding. The programme, which provides more than 
$2 billion per year in direct support to high-tech firms, has 
fostered development of new enterprises, and has guided the 
commercialisation of hundreds of new technologies from 
the laboratory to the market. Given the instrumental role of 
the SBIR programme and its successes, it is surprising how 
little attention this programme receives, although the UK has 
latterly attempted to copy its success, but to little avail so far, 
as we will see in the next chapter.
Block highlights the lack of visibility of SBIR in an 
effort to illustrate what he describes as ‘a discrepancy between 
the growing importance of these federal initiatives and the 
absence of public debate or discussion about them’.108  
As indicated in the introduction of this pamphlet and again 
in the early stages of this chapter, this discrepancy poses an 
exceptional challenge to the policy makers and the public 
who are engaged in economic debates and efforts to address 
the current economic crises and pave the way for the future of 
innovation and development in the globalised world.
Orphan drugs
A year after the SBIR programme was established, a further 
legislative spur to private sector innovation occurred, this 
time specific to the biotech industry. The 1983 Orphan 
Drug Act (ODA) made it possible for small, dedicated 
biotech firms to carve a slither from the drug market. The 
act includes certain tax incentives, clinical as well as R&D 
subsidies, fast-track drug approval, along with strong 
intellectual and marketing rights for products developed 
for treating rare conditions. A rare disease is defined as 
any disease that affects less than 200,000 people and given 
this potentially small market, it was argued that without 
financial incentives these potential drugs would remain 
‘orphans’. The impetus behind this legislation was to 
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advance the investment of pharmaceutical companies in 
developing these drugs.
The protection provided by the act enables small firms 
to improve their technology platforms and scale up their 
operations, enabling them to advance to the position of 
becoming a major player in this industry. In fact, orphan drugs 
played an important role for the major biopharmaceutical firms 
such as Genzyme, Biogen, Amgen and Genentech to become 
what they are today. Since the introduction of this legislation, 
2,364 products have been designated as orphan drugs and 
370 of these drugs have gained marketing approval.109
In addition to the generous tax incentives, subsidies, 
access to fast-track approval and extensive intellectual and 
marketing rights for products designated as ‘orphan’ drugs, 
Lazonick and Tulum draw attention to the fact that a drug 
can be designated as ‘orphan’ for multiple indications.110 
The example of Novartis illustrates this point. In May 2001 
the company received marketing approval by the FDA with 
market exclusivity for its ‘chronic myelogenous leukemia’ drug 
Gleevec under the Orphan Drug Act. In 2005 over a span 
of five months, Novartis applied for and was later granted 
orphan drug designation for five different indications for this 
same drug. According to the company’s 2010 annual report, 
Gleevec recorded sales globally in 2010 were $4.3 billion, thus 
confirming the point raised by Lazonick and Tulum, that 
even when the market size for a drug is small, the revenues 
can be considerable.111
When it comes to the substantial revenues that are 
generated from drugs designated as ‘orphan’ it is not only 
small firms that appear to be benefiting. Some of the world’s 
largest pharmaceutical firms such as Roche, Johnson 
& Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer among others 
have applied for orphan drug designation. The National 
Organization for Rare Disorders, a non-profit public 
organisation largely funded by federal government, has 
been encouraging large pharmaceutical firms to share their 
redundant proprietary knowledge, through licensing deals, 
with the smaller biotech firms to develop drugs for orphan 
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indications. Lazonick and Tulum explain the importance of 
this legislation by calculating the share of orphan drugs within 
total product revenues for major biopharmaceutical firms.112 
The financial histories of the six leading bio-pharmaceutical 
(BP) companies reveal a dependence on orphan drugs as 
a significant portion of the companies’ overall product 
revenues. In fact, 59 per cent of total product revenues and 61 
per cent of the product revenues of the six leading dedicated 
biopharmaceutical firms come from orphan drug sales. When 
this calculation also includes the later generation derivatives of 
drugs that have orphan status, the figure (calculated for 2008) 
goes up to 74 per cent of total revenues and 74 per cent of the 
product revenues for the six leading biopharmaceutical firms. 
Comparing the timing and growth of revenues for orphan and 
non-orphan ‘blockbusters’, Lazonick and Tulum show that 
orphan drugs are more numerous, their revenue growth began 
earlier, and many of them have greater 2007 sales than leading 
non-orphan drugs.113
The central role that orphan drugs have played in leading 
the development of the biotech industry is undeniable, yet 
this is just one of many critical moves the US government 
made in supporting the biotech industry. It is also evident that 
big pharma plays a significant role in the biopharmaceutical 
industry, as illustrated in analyses of orphan drugs. The 
two (big pharma and the biotech industry) are significantly 
dependent on one another in this area, and the distinction 
between big pharma and big biopharma has become ‘blurred’. 
However, the role of government for both these areas was 
crucial to their development and success. Lazonick and Tulum 
summarised the government’s role for both during the 2000s:
The US government still serves as an investor in knowledge creation, 
subsidizer of drug development, protector of drug markets, and, last 
but not least… purchaser of the drugs that the biopharmaceutical 
companies have to sell. The BP industry has become big business 
because of big government, and… remains highly dependent on big 
government to sustain its commercial success.114
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From this brief overview of these three examples  
— DARPA, SBIR and orphan drugs — a general point can be 
drawn: the USA has spent the last few decades using active 
interventionist policies to drive private sector innovation in 
pursuit of public policy goals. What all three interventions 
have in common is that they do not tie the shirt-tails of 
government to any one firm; no accusations of lame-duck 
industrial policy here. Instead it is a nimble government that 
rewards innovation and directs resources over a relatively 
short time horizon to the companies that show promise, 
through either supply-side (DARPA) or through demand side 
and start up interventions (SBIR and orphan drugs). Either 
way, the government has not simply created the ‘conditions 
for innovation’, but actively funded the early radical research 
and created the necessary networks between state agencies 
and the private sector to allow the commercial development 
to occur. This is very far from current UK government policy, 
which assumes that the state can simply nudge the private 
sector into action.
The National Nanotechnology Initiative
The entrepreneurial role that the state can play in creating 
strategic decisions in how to foster the development of new 
technologies, which provide the foundation for decades 
of economic growth, has most recently been seen in the 
development of nanotechnology in the USA. The types of 
investments that the state has made have gone beyond simply 
creating the right infrastructure, funding basic research and 
setting rules and regulations.
Nanotechnology is very likely to be the next general 
purpose technology, having a pervasive effect on many 
different sectors and being the foundation of economic growth. 
However, while this is commonly accepted now, in the 1990s it 
was not. Motoyama, Appelbaum and Parker describe in detail 
how the US government has in fact been the lead visionary in 
dreaming the possibility of a nanotech revolution — making 
the ‘against all odds’ initial investments, and explicitly forming 
The US entrepreneurial state
dynamic networks between different public actors (universities, 
national labs, government agencies) and when available, the 
private sector, to kick start a major new revolution, which 
many believe will be even more important than the computer 
revolution.115 It has even been the first to ‘define’ what 
nanotechnology is.
It did so through the active development of the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI). Motoyama, Appelbaum and 
Parker describe how it was set up:
The creation and subsequent development of the NNI has been 
neither a purely bottom-up nor top-down approach: it did not 
derive from a groundswell of private sector initiative, nor 
was it the result of strategic decisions by government officials. 
Rather it resulted from the vision and efforts of a small group of 
scientists and engineers at the National Science Foundation and 
the Clinton White House in the late 1990s… It seems clear that 
Washington selected nanotechnology as the leading front runner, 
initiated the policy, and invested in its development on a multi-
billion dollar scale.116
The government’s objective was to find the ‘next new 
thing’ to replace the internet. After receiving ‘blank stares’, the 
key players (civil servants) in Washington convinced the US 
government to proceed to invest in creating a new research 
agenda, and to prepare a set of budget options and a clear 
division of labour between the different agencies. It even had 
first to define nanotech. They did so by arguing that the private 
sector could not expect to lead applications of nanotech that 
were still so far away (10–20 years) from the commercial market:
Industry generally invests only in developing cost-competitive 
products in the 3 to 5 year time frame. It is difficult for industry 
management to justify to their shareholders the large investments in 
long-term, fundamental research needed to make nanotechnology-
based products possible. Furthermore, the highly interdisciplinary 
nature of the needed research is incompatible with many current 
corporate structures.117
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This quote is fascinating because of the way it highlights 
how the private sector is too focused on the short term (mainly 
but not only as a result of the effect the 1980s shareholder 
revolution has had on long-term thinking of business) and 
its rigid structures. Far from being less innovative than the 
private sector, government has shown itself to be more flexible 
and dynamic in understanding the connections between 
different disciplines (physics, chemistry, materials science, 
biology, medicine, engineering and computer simulation). As 
Block and Keller discuss, government actions around cutting 
edge new technologies have often had to remain veiled behind 
a ‘hidden’ industrial policy.118 The public sector activists 
around nanotechnology had to continuously talk about a 
‘bottom-up’ approach so that it would not seem to be too 
heavily ‘picked’ and championed. Though in the end, ‘While 
most of the policy making process involved consultation with 
academics and corporate experts, it is clear that the principal 
impetus and direction — from background reports to budget 
scheme — came from the top.’ 119 The approach succeeded 
in convincing Clinton, and then Bush, that investments in 
nanotechnology would have the potential to ‘spawn the growth 
of future industrial productivity’ and that the ‘the country that 
leads in discovery and implementation of nanotechnology will 
have great advantage in the economic and military scene for 
many decades to come’. 120
In the end, the US government took action. It not only 
selected nanotechnology as the sector to back most forcefully 
(‘picking it’ as a winning sector), but also proceeded to 
launch the NNI, review rules and regulations concerning 
nanotech by studying the various risks involved, and become 
the largest investor, even beyond what it has done for biotech 
and the life sciences. Although the strongest action was 
carried out top down by key senior level officers in the NSF 
and the White House, the actual activity behind nanotech 
was, as in the case of the internet and computers, heavily 
decentralised through various state agencies (a total of 13, 
led by the NSF, but also involving the NIH, the Defense 
Department and SBIR). Across these different agencies, 
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currently the US government spends approximately  
$1.8 billion annually on the NNI.
Nanotechnology today does not yet have a major 
impact because of the lack of commercialisation of new 
technologies. Motoyama, Appelbaum and Parker claim that 
this is due to the excessive investments in research, and lack 
of investments in commercialisation.121 They call for more 
active government investment in commercialisation. However, 
this raises the question, if government has to do the research, 
fund major infrastructure investments and undertake the 
commercialisation, what is the role of the private sector?
This chapter has highlighted the important role that 
government has played in leading innovation and economic 
growth. Far from stifling innovation and being a weight 
to the system, it has fostered innovation and dynamism in 
many industries, with the private sector often taking a back 
seat. Ironically it has often done so in the USA, which in 
policy circles is often discussed as following a more ‘market’ 
oriented model than Europe. This has not been the case 
where innovation is concerned. It is to the implications of this 
experience for UK policies that we now turn.
89

91
5   Lessons for the UK 
 
 
One of the core messages of this pamphlet is that the history of 
technological change suggests that the key role of government 
is not about fixing market failures, but rather about actively 
creating the market for the new technologies by envisioning the 
opportunity space and allowing the right network of private and 
public actors to meet in order for radical innovation to occur. 
The role of government has, in this sense, been more about fixing 
‘network failures’ than about ‘market failure’. It has also been 
about preventing ‘opportunity failures’ — government’s willingness 
to think big and take risks has created new opportunities and 
markets, whereas the private sector has shied away because of the 
long time horizons and the high failure rates.
An article in The Economist recently claimed that the 
‘government has a terrible record at picking winners’.122 
A look at the massive impact that government’s targeted 
large investments in industries such as steel, railways, 
air travel, silicon microchip manufacturing, automotive 
manufacturing, computer, biotechnology and the internet, 
and nanotechnology shows this is just not true. Without the 
government pursuing a targeted investment strategy, none 
of these industries would have come into being. And being 
first matters because of the strong economies of scale.
In this respect, Britain has got its innovation policy 
all wrong, with negative implications for growth in the long 
run. Taxpayer support is misdirected and opportunities are 
being missed. Innovation policy needs to focus on creating 
the conditions that allow innovation to flourish, but also, 
and perhaps especially, on directly commissioning and 
procuring innovative solutions. History tells us that these 
will not happen without a strong push by the state. Here are 
some suggestions of improvements that can be made.
Lessons for the UK
Cost neutral opportunity: reform the Small Business 
Research Initiative programme
The UK Government has recently tried to copy the success 
of the US Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
programme by setting up in 2001 a scheme entitled the Small 
Business Research Initiative (SBRI), which is meant to act 
as a cross-departmental initiative improving the success of 
small R&D-based businesses in obtaining contracts from 
government bodies. With a target rate of 2.5 per cent, the 
initial objective was to place £50 million of government R&D 
contracts per annum with SMEs through the SBRI website. 
However, by 2004, contracts worth only £2 million per year 
were being advertised and none of the key departments 
participated.123 Following pressure, in particular from 
Cambridge-based innovation policy lobby groups, the SBRI 
was relaunched through the supply2.gov.uk web portal but a 
subsequent evaluation by the Richard report showed that two 
years later the scheme still bears no real resemblance to the 
US SBIR, mainly because hardly any of the projects actually 
involve R&D (for example contracts to supply Chinese books 
to local authority libraries), and many were research councils 
seeking grant proposals from academic researchers, and 
for which businesses are ineligible to apply.124 Furthermore, 
the maximum size of contracts typically covered by the 
supply2gov database is £100,000, compared with a typical 
size of $850,000 under US SBIR. The UK SBRI has suffered 
from a lack of ministerial attention and the fact that it is at 
odds with the culture of the procurement offices of national 
government. The 2011 budget included a welcome commitment 
to commit £20 million over the next two years to the SBRI, 
half of which would be earmarked for specific competitions 
to meet healthcare challenges. However, this is a drop in the 
ocean and should be dramatically increased within current 
procurement budgets in line with the US example.
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Cost saving: cut blanket support to small firms
In chapter 1 we saw that there is not much of a relationship 
between being small and having potential to grow. Yes, fast 
growing firms start out small but plenty of other small firms 
are not fast growing, nor do they want to be. Many smaller 
businesses have lower productivity because they are less 
well managed than larger firms, sometimes because they 
are more likely to be family-owned and family-run. Rather 
than giving handouts to small companies in the hope 
that they will grow it is better to give contracts to young 
companies that have already demonstrated ambition; 
it is more effective to commission the technologies that 
require innovation than hand out subsidies in the hope that 
innovation will follow. This approach could yield significant 
taxpayer savings if, for example, direct transfers to firms 
that are given just because of their size were ended, such 
as small business rate relief for smaller companies and 
inheritance tax relief for family firms.125
Cost saving: shift from R&D tax credits to 
commissioning R&D
Similarly, while there is a research component in innovation, 
there is not a linear relationship between research and 
development and economic growth. While it is important that 
the frontiers of science advance, and that economies develop 
the nodes and networks to enable knowledge to be transferred 
between different organisations and individuals, it does not 
follow that it is the best use of taxpayers’ money to subsidise 
the activity of R&D per se within individual firms. Although 
it is common sense that there is a relationship between a 
decision to engage in R&D and its cost, qualitative surveys of 
the effectiveness of the R&D tax credit for both large and small 
firms provide little evidence that it has positively impacted on 
the decision to engage in R&D, rather than simply providing 
a welcome cash transfer to some firms that have already done 
so.126 There is also a potential problem under the current 
R&D tax credit system that it does not hold firms accountable 
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for whether they have conducted new innovation that would 
not otherwise have taken place, or simply undertaken more 
routine forms of product development. In time, therefore, as 
the entrepreneurial state is built, it would be more effective to 
use some of the expenditure on R&D tax credits to directly 
commission the technological advance in question.
Cost saving: do not be distracted by low-tax 
enterprise zones
Related to the specific issue about R&D tax credits is the 
more general point that investment in innovation is generally 
not very sensitive to taxes. As Keynes emphasised, business 
investment (especially innovative investment) is a function 
of ‘animal spirits’, the gut instinct of investors about future 
growth prospects. These are more affected by the strength 
of a nation’s science base, its system of credit creation, and 
quality of education and hence human capital rather than 
taxes. Tax cuts in the 1980s did not produce more investment 
in innovation, only affecting income distribution (increasing 
inequality). For this same reason, ‘enterprise zones’ which 
are focused almost exclusively on benefits related to tax and 
weakened regulation are not innovation zones. Best to save 
that money or to invest it in properly run science parks.127
Cost saving: do not implement the patent box
As discussed in chapter 2, firms are increasingly producing 
patents of little value. In this sense, patents are overly 
emphasised as necessary for innovation to occur. In fact, 
evidence has suggested that many firms can appropriate their 
innovations through other measures, and that the increase in 
patenting has not led to an increase in the rate of innovation.128 
Notwithstanding this evidence, the UK Government claims 
that patents have a strong link to ongoing high-tech R&D 
and has thus suggested a patent box — a preferential regime 
for profits arising from patents — to reward patent holders. 
This idea has been criticised ferociously by the Institute for 
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Fiscal Studies as being a waste of money and not encouraging 
research. The patent box will not stimulate the types of 
innovation that are needed because it only targets the income 
earned from patents not the research itself (a similar claim 
we make above about R&D tax credits, since historically 
they have been badly controlled so that it is not clear that the 
money has been spent on research). The patent box and many 
SBRI programmes direct returns to potentially mediocre 
and non innovative companies rather than the leaders of 
innovation. Furthermore, patents are increasingly being 
applied to upstream areas like research tools, stunting rather 
than encouraging research (and replication), putting the open 
science system at risk.129
Additional expenditure: massive reform and 
expansion of technology strategy board
The Government should implement the recommendations the 
CBI made in 2006 to reform the UK Technology Strategy 
Board (TSB) along the US DARPA model.130 With a much 
expanded budget, the TSB should therefore become more of a 
dynamic commissioner of innovative solutions at the frontiers 
of innovation and research. It should welcome (rather than shy 
away from) the risky territory of blue sky research, facilitating 
networking between business and academia, and engaging in 
pre-commercial procurement to a far greater extent.
The UK Government should create a vision whereby the 
TSB can bring together government departments, research 
councils, local economic partnerships and other public 
bodies to address specific challenges, such as those around 
green technology. If the TSB functioned in this way it would 
demonstrate that the core innovation problem is not one of 
‘market failure’ but rather one of ‘network failure’, and show 
it understands the government’s role in creating and leading 
those networks. As Dosi, Llerena and Labini emphasise, for 
such a network to function properly, the different agents in the 
network must be strong not weak.131 Hence fundamental to this 
strategy will be a strong science base in UK universities and 
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public laboratories. The fact that UK science is falling behind 
that of its main competitors is worrying.132
An enhanced model for the TSB would be emblematic 
of a shift of the UK government away from a system where 
technological challenges are showered with tax incentives, 
subsidies and pricing debates (the latter in the case of 
pharmaceuticals) and more to a system where the government 
commissioned solutions to specific problems and catalysed 
potential opportunities from the private sector, without 
necessarily specifying how these should be achieved.
The TSB and other BIS schemes should focus more 
on those private-public ecologies that will enable radical 
innovation to emerge. It is especially radical innovation that 
embodies the type of Knightian uncertainty that private 
venture capital shies away from, and it is especially in this 
area that the leading role of the public sector is essential. 
This involves supporting the full span of activities that were 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
Cost saving: retain proportion of ownership of 
state-backed intellectual property
Where technological breakthroughs have occurred as a 
result of targeted state interventions, there is potential for 
the state, over time, to reap some of the financial rewards, 
by retaining ownership over a small proportion of the 
intellectual property created. This is not to say the state 
should ever have exclusive licence or hold a large enough 
proportion of the value of an innovation that it deters a 
wider spread of its application — the role of government is 
not to run commercial enterprises, but to spark innovation 
elsewhere. But government should explore whether it is 
possible to own a slither of the value it has created, which over 
time could create significant value and then be reinvested into 
growth-generating investments.
For example, we saw in chapter 1 that three-quarters 
of the new molecular bio-pharmaceutical entities owe their 
creation to publicly funded laboratories. Yet in the past ten 
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years, the top ten companies in this industry have made 
more in profits than the rest of the Fortune 500 companies 
combined. The industry also enjoys great tax advantages: 
its R&D costs are deductible, and so are many of its massive 
marketing expenses, some of which are counted as R&D.133
After taking on most of the R&D bill, the state often 
gives away the outputs at a rock bottom rate. For example, 
Taxol, the cancer drug discovered by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), is sold by Bristol-Myers Squibb for $20,000 per 
year’s dose, 20 times the manufacturing cost. Yet, the company 
agreed to pay the NIH only 0.5 per cent in royalties for the drug.
Similarly, where an applied technological breakthrough 
is directly financed by the government, it should in return 
be able to extract a small royalty from its application. Again, 
this should not be sufficient as to prohibit its dissemination 
throughout the economy, or to disincentivise the innovators 
from taking the risk in the first place. Instead it makes the 
policy of spending taxpayers’ money to light the innovative 
spark more sustainable, by enabling part of the financial gains 
from so doing to be recycled directly back into the programme 
over time.
Green technologies
There is currently a global race to be the leader in green 
technologies. Britain has a potential to do well in this race but 
is in danger of being left behind. The remainder of this chapter 
considers the application of what has been learnt so far to spur 
greater innovations with green technology application.
In the USA the stimulus packages included 11.5 per cent 
of the budget devoted to green investment, but in the UK the 
figure is only 6.9 per cent, far lower than China (34.3 per cent), 
France (21 per cent) or South Korea (80.5 per cent).134 In fact, 
in July 2010 the South Korean Government announced that it 
would double its spending on green research to the equivalent 
of £1.9 billion by 2013 (almost 2 per cent of its annual GDP), 
which means that between 2009 and 2013 it will have spent  
£59 billion on this type of research.
Lessons for the UK
This is not a new problem. Data for 2007 show the UK 
near the bottom of the league when comparing government 
investment in energy R&D, spending less than US and Asian 
competitors and some other European countries (figure 8). 
The problem is that the private sector is not coming in to 
fill the gap so, overall, the UK’s investment of 12.6 billion in 
2009/10 135 is, according to PIRC, ‘under 1 per cent of UK 
Gross Domestic Product; half of what South Korea currently 
invests in green technologies annually; and less than what the 
UK presently spend on furniture in a year’.136
Source: Committee on Climate Change, 2010 137
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Despite the Prime Minister’s pledge in 2010 to lead ‘the 
greenest government ever’,138 in reality the spending cuts have 
caused established programmes in these areas to be scaled 
back. In 2010/11, £85 million was cut from the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change budget, including £34 million 
from the renewable support programmes. Furthermore, 40 per 
cent cuts have been applied to the 2011 budget of the Carbon 
Trust and 50 per cent cuts to the Energy Saving Trust:
Combined with a reluctance to guarantee sources of green finance 
over the long term — including failing to guarantee grants for 
electric cars beyond one year, and pledging to review the Feed-In 
Tariff structure in 2012 — these moves have not created an optimum 
environment for green investment.139
An April 2011 revision has already halved the feed-in 
tariff for commercial installations above 50kW in order to fund 
the promised support for small residential installations. Nor 
has the effect of previous initiatives been proven: the April 
2009 budget tried to accelerate emissions reduction in power 
generation by requiring carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
to be fitted to all new coal-fired stations (and retrofitted to 
all existing stations by 2014); yet according to the House of 
Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, this could 
just lead to a renewed expansion of gas-fired generation rather 
than substantial investment in CCS technology.140
This fits a broader picture of how EU countries are 
responding to current economic circumstances. Ernst 
and Young report a record global investment (including 
private and public investment such as feed-in tariffs for 
solar projects) into cleantech of $243 billion in 2010, but 
comment that the ‘market is in flux’ in the face of challenging 
financial conditions, with big variations in investment 
across geographies and technologies.141 China receives most 
investment, followed by the USA, with countries in Europe 
struggling to balance financial commitments to developing 
clean technologies against managing national deficit.
Lessons for the UK
In a sense, given the argument above that innovation 
is about having the right networks in the economy and then 
commissioning specific technologies, it could be argued that 
scaling back direct subsidies and grants, regardless of the 
purpose, is not troublesome if innovative forces were coming 
from elsewhere. However, a look at recent data seems to imply 
that this is not the case. In fact, the UK is at risk of falling 
behind in this area, having been seen as a country that was 
catching up in the last decade.
Since green technology is still in its very early stage, 
when Knightian uncertainty is highest, venture capital 
funding is focused on some of the safer bets rather than 
on the radical innovation which is so needed to allow the 
sector to transform society in the ways that the 20-20-20 
policies are hoping.142 Ghosh and Nanda claim that it is 
virtually only public sector funds that are currently funding 
the riskiest and the most capital intensive projects in green 
technology — the ones in the upper right hand corner in 
figure 9.143 Venture capital funding is concentrating virtually 
only on some of the areas in the bottom right. This is highly 
problematic since the early stage of the sector means that by 
definition many of the needed developments are still capital 
intensive so unless the government makes a mark, these 
important areas will remain underdeveloped.
 Source: Ghosh and Nanda 144
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Historically the UK had been viewed as one of the most 
innovative countries in clean technologies starting since 
2000, despite its role as a laggard in the early 1990s,145 with 
investments in cleantech infrastructure and R&D increasing 
in response to government commitments of £405 million 
to cut down the carbon emissions by around one-third by 
2020.146 Compared with other countries the UK’s cleantech 
innovation sourced more from smaller firms and academia 
so would seem generally supportive of an environment for 
venture capital investment.147 However, while venture capital 
investment in cleantech in the USA recovered during 2010, 
venture capital investment activity in the UK was at its lowest 
level since 2003.148
Although global investment may be approaching 
recent record levels, Ernst and Young’s analysis of the total 
investment (all sources) required to achieve the EU 2020 
target, of 20 per cent of energy supplied by renewable sources 
by 2020, estimated an annual investment gap of €35 billion 
for European member states to find each year.149 Such large 
investment requirements are required at a time when venture 
capitalists begin to realise the limitations of their investment 
models. For instance in 2009 observers noted venture capital 
funds shifting focus to funding cleantech investments with 
less than two-year pay-back periods. More incremental 
innovations that deal with energy efficiency appear to be given 
priority over the cutting edge bio-fuels or advanced solar 
technologies.150 Analysis of the investment activity of UK firms 
funded by venture capitalists found two-thirds of firms had 
no patents, suggesting investors had not primarily focused 
on radical innovations, and that those investors supporting 
patenting firms tended to be larger, with a wide coverage of 
industries, suggesting a lack of specialisation.151
Figure 10 shows that Japan is currently the global leader 
in environmental technology patents, possibly because its 
corporate culture and chronically low interest rates promote 
an unusually long payback horizon compared with the 
Anglo-American norm. The right-hand side of the scale is the 
country’s share in world environmental patents relative to the 
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share of the country in total world patents; an RTA greater 
than one measures specialisation in environmental patents. 
So, for example, Japan’s high global share in environmental 
patents is combined with an internal specialisation in 
environmental technologies; China has also patented more in 
environmental technologies than other sectors, although this is 
not (yet) enough to achieve global dominance.
Source: WIPO152
Note: RTA is the share of the country in world environmental patents relative to 
the share of the country in total world patents; RTA > 1 measures specialisation in 
environmental patents.
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Likewise Ghosh and Nanda highlight that venture 
capitalists are increasingly targeting incremental innovations 
in established technologies to improve energy efficiency, 
moving away from more radical forms of innovation for 
energy production.153 The preferences for familiar technology 
and quick payback add to fears of a renewed ‘dash for gas’ as 
the most likely way for the UK to try meeting its emissions 
reduction commitments, even though this will add to dangers 
of energy insecurity and of sharply rising costs when gas 
reserves begin to deplete.
The financial and technological risks of developing 
alternative forms of energy production have been too high 
for venture capital to support, owing to the size and duration 
of technical risks beyond traditional proof of concept. For 
instance, even if proof of concept is achieved, it may not be 
feasible to produce at the scale required for energy production. 
The financial risks of supporting a firm to reach the stage 
where technology is scalable is too great for most venture 
capital funds. In this sense the absence of liquid IPO markets 
for cleantech firms restricts the technology that venture 
capitalists can support. Ghosh and Nanda suggest that, in the 
absence of an appropriate investment model, venture capital 
may struggle to provide the types of rapid development of 
radical innovation solutions required.154
The conclusion that might follow is that the government 
needs to be commissioning the development of the riskiest 
technologies. But this is not happening either. The main 
initiative of the Coalition Government is to establish a green 
investment bank to provide seedcorn funding for green 
technologies. It is based on the notion that the green revolution 
can be led privately, simply ‘incentivised’ by the state. This is 
wrong (no other tech revolution has occurred this way), and 
the current amounts being discussed are too insignificant to 
make any difference. The green investment bank initiative does 
not learn from previous revolutions in the importance of active 
state- led investments, allowing the country to ‘be first’ and 
hence reap future increasing returns. China is building one 
power station a week and Britain is fiddling with play money.
Lessons for the UK
Improving the UK’s ageing energy infrastructure will 
require massive investments. The proposed green investment 
bank could help to get important projects off the drawing 
board. However, as the cash for it is dependent on selling 
off strategic assets in difficult market conditions, it will take 
many months or even years before the fund is able to make a 
meaningful difference. And the current figures are peanuts. 
However, expanded and broadened, the green investment 
bank could grow into a strategic investment bank, like the 
European Investment Bank or Germany’s Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau. Those have a proven track record of promoting 
infrastructure development and returning a profit for the 
taxpayer — the UK has always lacked a comparable source 
of long-term finance, and would gain from developing one. 
If it took more of an innovation focus than the European 
Investment Bank and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, it 
could become a new type of public-sector strategic finance 
institution. This would be helpful particularly to get large scale 
projects off the ground. But it would not necessarily provide 
the incentive for the high risk innovative breakthroughs to 
occur in the first place.
The inability of the UK to lead the world in the 
development of green technologies is the result not of the lack 
of a green investment bank to provide seedcorn finance but 
of an underdeveloped ecology of networks and government 
procurement systems designed to wrench technological 
progress out of that system. Once the breakthroughs have 
occurred, finance will need to be found to transform our 
existing infrastructure to reduce its environmental impact. 
But that is about implementation, rather than innovation.
A clue to what is required is again found in the USA, 
where government funded initiatives are busy building 
on their understanding of what has worked in previous 
technological revolutions.
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Obama’s greentech initiative
With the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act by the current Obama administration, the Department 
of Energy (DOE) was allocated tens of billions of dollars to 
develop alternative energy technologies and to alter existing 
infrastructure to reduce energy waste. This recent initiative 
represents an enormous expansion of government spending to 
shape innovation in the civilian economy, exactly the opposite 
of what is being argued in the UK, where the debate continues 
to be the static one between ‘picking winners’ and ‘creating the 
right conditions’ while being ineffectual in allowing the UK to 
become leader in any sector.
In addition, the current US administration created a new 
programme, ARPA-E, which is modelled specifically on the 
DARPA model ‘to focus on “out of the box” transformational 
research that industry by itself cannot or will not support 
due to its high risk but were success would provide dramatic 
benefits for the nation’.155 The agency is charged with bringing 
forth a new, exciting direction to energy research that ‘will 
attract many of the U.S.’s best and brightest minds — those 
of experienced scientists and engineers, and especially, those 
of students and young researchers, including persons in the 
entrepreneurial world’.156 Using the DARPA model ARPA-E’s 
organisation is ‘flat, nimble, and sparse, capable of sustaining 
for long periods of time those projects whose promise remains 
real, while phasing out programmes that do not prove to 
be as promising as anticipated’.157 With a focus on network 
expansion, the agency was also established to develop a ‘new 
tool to bridge the gap between basic energy research and 
development/industrial innovation’.158
In 2009 the DOE awarded $377 million in funding for 
46 new multi-million dollar energy frontier research centers 
(EFRCs) located at universities, national laboratories, non-
profit organisations, and private firms throughout the US. 
Spanning a period of five years, the DOE has committed $777 
million to this initiative.159 The scale of funding signals that the 
DOE is committed to moving products through technological 
maturity and into the stage of broad production and 
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deployment. Hundreds of millions of dollars is being allocated 
to firms (through matching funds and loan programmes) by 
the DOE to support the development of productive facilities 
for solar panels, batteries for electric cars, biofuel projects, 
along with programmes focusing specifically on advancing the 
deployment of photovoltaics on homes and businesses.160
The recommendation to the UK government is 
clear. To maintain a lead in cleantech and greentech, the 
Government should be commissioning the development of 
break-through technologies in areas where it has a comparative 
advantage, creating a pull factor for innovations to flow 
through. There is no avoiding the fact that this will cost money, 
which is why we also propose that resources be diverted from 
flat subsidies of R&D activity and small businesses, which may 
or may not lead to innovation and growth.
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6  Final thoughts on risk-
taking in innovation:  
who gets the return? 
 
This pamphlet has attempted to highlight the active role 
that the state has played in generating innovation-led 
growth. As has been argued, this has entailed very risky 
investments — speculation for ‘creative destruction’.
In finance, it is commonly accepted that there is a 
relationship between risk and return. However, in the 
innovation game, this has not been the case. Risk-taking has 
been a collective endeavour while the returns have been much 
less collectively distributed. Often, the only return that the 
state gets for its risky investments are the indirect benefits 
of higher tax receipts that result from the growth that is 
generated by those investments. Is that enough?
There is indeed lots of talk of partnership between 
the government and private sector, yet while the efforts are 
collective, the returns remain private. Is it right that the 
National Science Foundation did not reap any financial return 
from funding the grant that produced the algorithm that led 
to Google’s search engine? 161 Can an innovation system based 
on government support be sustainable with such a system of 
rewards? The lack of knowledge in the public domain about 
the central entrepreneurial role that government plays in the 
growth of economies worldwide, beyond Keynesian demand 
management and ‘creating the conditions’ for growth, is 
currently putting the successful model in major danger.
This contrast is well depicted by the example offered in 
Vallas, Kleinman and Biscotti:
A new pharmaceutical that brings in more than $1 billion per year 
in revenue is a drug marketed by Genzyme. It is a drug for a rare 
disease that was initially developed by scientists at the National 
Institutes of Health. The firm set the price for a year’s dosage at 
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upward of $350,000. While legislation gives the government the 
right to sell such government-developed drugs at ‘reasonable’ prices, 
policymakers have not exercised this right. The result is an extreme 
instance where the costs of developing this drug were socialized, 
while the profits were privatized. Moreover, some of the taxpayers 
who financed the development of the drug cannot obtain it for their 
family members because they cannot afford it. 162
The socialised generation and privatised 
commercialisation of biopharmaceutical — and 
other — technologies could be followed by withdrawal of the 
state, if private companies used their profits to reinvest in 
research and further product development. The state’s role 
would then be limited to that of initially underwriting radical 
new discoveries, until they are generating profits that can fund 
ongoing discovery. But private-sector behaviour suggests that 
public institutions cannot pass the R&D baton in this way. 
And that the state’s role cannot be limited to that of planting 
seeds that can be subsequently relied on to grow freely.
Many of the problems being faced today by the Obama 
administration are indeed due to the fact that US taxpayers 
are virtually unaware of how their taxes foster innovation 
and growth in the USA, and that corporations that have 
made money from innovation that has been supported by the 
government are neither returning a significant portion of the 
profits to the government nor investing in new innovation.163 
They are sold the idea that this growth occurs as a result of 
individual ‘genius’, to Silicon Valley ‘entrepreneurs’, to venture 
capitalists, to what they think is a ‘weak’ state compared with 
the European system. These battles are also being played out 
in the UK where it is argued that the only way for the country 
to achieve growth is for it to be privately led and for the state 
to go back to its minimal role of ensuring the rule of law.
An implication of this pamphlet is that the only way to 
make growth ‘fairer’ and for the gains to be better shared 
is for economists, policy makers, and the general public to 
have a broader understanding of which agents in society take 
part of the fundamental risk-taking that is necessary to bring 
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on innovation-led growth. As has been argued, risk-taking 
and speculation are absolutely necessary for innovations to 
occur. The real Knightian uncertainty that innovation entails 
is in fact the reason that the private sector, including venture 
capital, often shies away from it.
Understanding the dynamics of innovation must be 
brought in line with our understanding of dynamics of 
inequality. These areas of economic thought have been 
separated since David Ricardo’s study of the effect of 
mechanisation on the wage–profit frontier — distribution. 
Recently, the relationship has come back in vogue with studies 
on how skill-biased technological change affects wages. This 
work explains inequality through how wages are affected by 
technologies like IT that favour skilled over unskilled labour 
by increasing its relative productivity and, therefore, its relative 
demand and wages. Inequality is thus explained here as a 
result of how economic incentives shaped by relative prices, the 
size of the market, and institutions create biases in factors of 
production, which then affect their returns.164 While this work 
provides some important insights, it does not explain many 
dynamics of inequality, including why within a sector, the 
different agents that take part of production and innovation 
reap such different benefits from the innovation. Inequality is 
indeed just as high within sectors as it is between.165
The idea of an entrepreneurial state suggests that one of 
the core missing links between growth and inequality  
(or to use the words of the EC 2020 strategy, between ‘smart’ 
and ‘inclusive’ growth) lies in a wider identification and 
understanding of the agents that contribute to the risk-taking 
required for that growth to occur. Bank bonuses, for example, 
should not logically be criticised using arguments against the 
greed and underlying inequality that is produced (even though 
these generate powerful emotions). Rather they should be 
argued against by attacking the underlying logical foundation 
on which they stand.
The received wisdom is that bankers take on very high 
risks, and when those risks reap a high return, they should in 
fact be rewarded — they deserve it. The same logic is used to 
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justify the exorbitantly high returns that powerful shareholders 
have earned in the last decades, which has been another 
prime source of increasing inequality. The logic here is that 
shareholders are the biggest risk takers since they only earn 
the returns that are left over once all the other economic actors 
are paid (the ‘residual’ if it exists, once workers and managers 
are paid their salaries, loans paid off, and so on). Hence when 
there is a large residual they are the proper claimant — they 
could in fact have earned nothing since there is no guarantee 
that there will be a residual.
However an understanding of risk that gives credit to the 
role of the public sector in innovative activities immediately 
makes it logical for there to be a more collective distribution 
of the rewards that should exist. Central to this question is 
the need to better understand how the division of ‘innovative 
labour’ maps into a division of rewards.166 The innovation 
literature has provided many interesting insights on the 
former, for example the changing dynamic between large 
firms, small firms, government research and individuals in the 
innovation process.167 But there is very little understanding 
on the latter. Yet, as Lazonick has argued, governments and 
workers also (and perhaps more so) invest in the innovation 
process without guaranteed returns.168
The critical point is the relation between those who 
bear risk in contributing their labour and capital to the 
innovation process and those who appropriate rewards from 
the innovation process. As a general set of propositions on 
the risk–reward nexus, when the appropriation of rewards 
outstrips the bearing of risk in the innovation process, 
the result is inequity; when the extent of inequity disrupts 
investment in the innovation process, the result is instability; 
and when the extent of instability increases the uncertainty 
of the innovation process, the result is a slowdown or even 
decline in economic growth.169 A major challenge for the UK 
and for Europe 2020 is to put in place institutions to regulate 
the risk–reward nexus so that it supports equitable and stable 
economic growth.
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To achieve this it is essential to understand innovation 
as a collective process, involving an extensive division of 
labour that can include many different types of contributors. 
As a foundation for the innovation process, the state typically 
makes investments in physical and human infrastructure that 
individual employees and business enterprises would be unable 
to fund because of a combination of the amount of fixed 
costs that investment in innovation requires and the degree 
of uncertainty that such investment entails. The state also 
subsidises the investments that enable individual employees 
and business enterprises to participate in the innovation 
process. Academic researchers often interact with industry 
experts in the knowledge-generation process. Within industry 
there are research consortia that may include companies that 
are otherwise in competition with one another. There are also 
user–producer interactions in product development within the 
value chain. And within the firm’s hierarchical and functional 
division of labour, there is the integration into the processes 
of organisational learning of the skills and efforts of large 
numbers of people involved in the hierarchical and functional 
division of labour.
Identification of who bears risk cannot be achieved by 
simply asserting that shareholders are the only contributors to 
the economy who do not have a guaranteed return — a central, 
and fallacious, assumption of financial economics based 
on agency theory. Indeed, in so far as public shareholders 
simply buy and sell shares, and are willing to do so because 
of the ease with which they can liquidate these portfolio 
investments, they may make little if any contribution to the 
innovation process and bear little if any risk of its success 
or failure. In contrast, governments may invest capital and 
workers may invest labour (time and effort) in the innovation 
process without any guarantee of a return commensurate with 
their investments. For the sake of innovation, we need social 
institutions that enable these risk-bearers to reap the returns 
from the innovation process, if and when it is successful.
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Conclusion
A core lesson of this pamphlet is the need to develop a new 
industrial policy which learns from the past experiences in 
which the state has played a leading, entrepreneurial, role in 
achieving innovation-led growth. State-funded organisations 
(mainly decentralised ones such as DARPA, SBIR and so on) 
have been fundamentally involved in generating radically new 
products and processes, which have changed the way that 
businesses operate and citizens live — transforming economies 
forever, from the internet revolution to the biotech revolution to 
what (it is hoped) will be the greentech revolution. It has also 
been argued that a core way to tackle smart and inclusive growth 
together is to ensure that the gains from innovation are just as 
collective as the risk-taking underlying it is.
In seeking innovation-led growth, it is fundamental 
to understand the important roles that both the public and 
private sector can play. This requires not only understanding 
the different ecologies between the public and private sector, 
but especially rethinking what it is that the public is bringing to 
that ecology. The assumption that the public sector can at best 
incentivise private sector led innovation (through subsidies, 
tax reductions, carbon pricing, green investment banks and so 
on) — a claim being propagated heavily in the UK, especially 
but not only in the face of the recent crisis and ensuing 
deficits — fails to account for the many examples in which the 
leading entrepreneurial force came from the state rather than 
from the private sector.
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